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AN "AGE OF [IM]POSSIBILITY": RHETORIC,
WELFARE REFORM, AND POVERTY
Lisa A. Crooms*
THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM. By Joel F. Handler. New
Haven: Yale University Press. ·1995. Pp. ix, 177. $12.
LIVING ON THE EDGE: THE REALITIES OF WELFARE IN AMERICA.
By Mark Robert Rank. New York: Columbia University Press.
1994. Pp. xii, 266. $14.
"[P]erhaps most important, we are gaining ground in restoring fundamental values. The crime rate, the welfare and food stamp rolls,
the poverty rate and the teen pregnancy rate are all down. And as
they go down, prospects for America's future go up. We live in an
age of possibility."1
On January 23, 1996, President Bill Clinton so delivered his
fourth State of the Union address. In it, he defined "our first challenge: to cherish our children and strengthen the American family. "2 Clinton continued: "For too Imig our welfare system has
undermined the values of family and work instead of supporting
them .... I challenge people on welfare to make the most of this
opportunity for independence. And I challenge American b_usinesses to give people on welfare the chance."3
Clinton's remarks illustrate how the current bipartisan discourse
about welfare reform frames the issue of poverty as one of moral
failure and personal irresponsibility fueled by the financial incentives of public assistance.4 Those who view poverty in this way believe that the social contract imposes on members of society a duty
to "contribute ... by supporting themselves and their families if
they can" (Handler, p. 3), and they see one's ability to fulfill this

* Visiting Associate Professor, Howard University School of Law. B.A. 1984, Howard
University; J.D. 1991, University of Michigan. - Ed.
1. President Bill Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 1996), reprinted in N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 1996, at A14.
2. Id. See generally Alison Mitchell, Clinton Offers Challenge to Nation, Declaring, 'Era
of Big Government Is Over,' N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1996, at Al.
3. Clinton, supra note 1.
4. See Rank, pp. 71-72 (noting that "many contend that because benefits increase with
the size of a household, women on welfare have a financial incentive to bear more children");
see also Michael Wines, 'Not My Job.' 'Not Our Job.' So Whose Job Is It?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
9, 1995, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1, 3.
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duty largely as a matter of individual efforts For the able-bodied,
failure to discharge this duty raises an irrebuttable presumption of
personal and civic irresponsibility that strips them of their right to
human dignity. 6
This term of the social contract, the defining conundrum of U.S.
social welfare policy, rests between two conflicting sets of principles. On the one hand, individualism, opportunity, and liberty lie at
the center of the liberal foundation of U.S. national identity.
"Throughout ... history, Americans have enthusiastically embraced
individualism [and the c]losely associated . . . concept of selfreliance."7 These ideas are coupled with "the widely shared belief
that the United States is a land where opportunities exist for all
who are willing to work for them and that individual virtue and
talent can overshadow the constraints of class, race or ethnicity"
(Rank, p. 200). On the other hand, real need and poverty, most
starkly evidenced by the severe maldistribution of wealth, exist in
this regime that legally protects the rights of property holders while
affording no parallel legal right to fulfillment of one's basic needs.s
5. Republicans and Democrats part company at this point. Although both appear interested in implementing an authoritarian agenda that penalizes the poor for their perceived
sloth and immorality, they disagree about how best to encourage those on AFDC to make an
effort to support their families. This is illustrated by their proposals for moving AFDC recipients from welfare to waged work as well as the assumptions on which those proposals are
based. On the one hand, Democrats tend to support education and job-training programs
because they believe that the poor are entitled to an equal opportunity to compete in the
labor market. By emphasizing government-subsidized, human capital development, the
Democrats both acknowledge that many on welfare Jack basic skills and create a government
obligation to provide recipients with training in order to realize the goal of equal opportunity. On the other hand, Republicans tend to prioritize immediate job placement based on
an apparent belief that welfare recipients have all the marketable skills they need to secure
employment. Implicit in this approach is the assumption that welfare recipients succumb to
the financial incentives of cash benefits and depend on the program because they lack the
will to do otherwise. See Handler, pp. 110-38 (discussing the "sharp divisions within Congress, the administration, the states and the public over many of the reform proposals"); see
also Rank, pp. 25-35 (discussing various explanations or theories of poverty and welfare
recipiency).
6. Rank's recounting of a story about a member of the Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors illustrates this conclusion. The board member "proposed that the county government begin selling the organs of dead welfare recipients" regardless of consent because "[i]f
they can't help society while they're alive, maybe they can help it while they're dead." Rank,
p. 2; see also Rank, p. 39 (noting that most Americans view welfare recipients as failing in
their civic and social duty, a "highly stigmatized behavior").
7. Rank, p. 200; see also Charles A. Reich, The Liberty Impact of the New Property, 31
WM. & MARY L. REv. 295, 295 (1990) (identifying "liberty, democracy, living under law,
equality and owning property in an individual way" as "democratic ideals").
8. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Economic Rights Under the United States Constitution, 32
CoLUM. J. TRANSNATL. L. 97 (1994); Wayne McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Process
and the Right of Livelihood, 82 KY. LJ. 397 (1994); Michael J. Phillips, Another Look at
Economic Substantive Due Process, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 265; see also Carrie E. Johnson, Policy
and Prejudice, 10 BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. 134, 136 (1995) ("The argument for limited federal welfare intervention seems to suggest that economic security is not a citizenship right for
which the government is responsible, but rather an ideal for which individual citizens must
strive."); Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94
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Within this context, the poor and images of poverty control the behavior of the nonpoor and make them honor the terms of the social
contract (Handler, p. 148).
Against this backdrop social welfare policy makers construct
proposals purportedly designed to respond to real need and suffering without threatening the fundamental values of work, family,
and social order (Handler, p. 2). To them, public assistance must
satisfy three requirements: (1) it must not encourage able-bodied
workers, particularly those in low-wage jobs, to abandon their employment;9 (2) it must not encourage recipients to abandon proper
gender roles;10 and (3) it must not facilitate the anarchy and lawlessness that lie in the wake of the loss of social order (Handler, p.
2).
Whether these requirements have anything to do with eradicating poverty depends entirely on one's views about poverty and its
causes.11 For those who see poverty as a question of moral failure,
YALE LJ. 1 (1984) (describing a social vision which compels, inter alia, alleviating misery
through "adequate and not merely minimal allotments of food, clothing, medical care, shelter"); Bob Herbert, Asleep at the Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1995, at A17 (characterizing federal moves to cut social welfare programs as "abandoning its responsibility to provide
even the most minimal level of assistance to Americans left without any other resources").
9. According to some commentators, social welfare policy mainly functions to maintain
labor discipline among low-waged workers. See, e.g., FRANCES A. Fox PIVEN & RICHARD
CLOWARD, REGULATING TIIE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBUC WELFARE 365-97 (updated
ed. 1993). As Jack Rothman recently noted, welfare grants remain at low levels in order to
"pressure people to drop out of the program and [to] join the ranks of cheap labor ... who
can ... be hired dirt-cheap to work for the big winners in business and industry." Jack
Rothman, Tinkering Won't Work on Welfare, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1996, at B9; see also PIVEN
& CLOWARD, supra, at 372 (noting that "[b]y 1990, the maximum benefit was less than half
the poverty level in a majority of the states, and Jess than a third of that level in a quarter of
the states").
10. I refer to the gender roles that govern family formation and the· division of labor in
traditional, two-parent families. Women who accept this role must limit their childbearing to
the confines of the traditional two-parent family. Men in tum must assume primary responsibility for the financial support of their domestic, familial dependents.
Since the inception of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program,
the policymakers have worked to avoid the immorality commonly associated with single
motherhood. As Handler notes, the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program, which
preceded AFDC, came into being at "the moment of the full flowering of the patriarchal
domestic code." Predictably, many who "feared that aid to single mothers ... would weaken
the responsibility of fathers and encourage single parenthood" opposed it. Handler, p. 24.
The eventual compromise program provided aid to " 'children of worthy character, suffering
from temporary misfortune, and children of reasonably efficient and deserving mothers.'"
Handler, p. 24 (footnotes omitted). It purportedly aimed to permit these mothers to focus on
their primary, domestic caretaking responsibilities, undistracted by waged work. The limits
on the pool of eligible recipients, however, undermined its ability to remedy poverty. The
restrictions denied benefits to all poor families except those headed by morally "fit and
proper" single mothers. Handler, p. 24. The resultant recipient population was virtually all
white and widowed. See Handler, p. 25. See generally Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single
Parents, 18 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 19, 24-51 (1995) (discussing the stigmatization of single
parenthood).
11. Many scholars have discussed the impact of different perspectives in various contexts.
For example, Vincene Verdun notes that both the proponents and opponents of reparations
for black people "approach the issue ••. from two distinct perspectives that are based on
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placing such requirements on welfare recipients seems completely
warranted.12 For those who see it as a combination of structural
flaws and individual behavior, focusing on moral failure misses the
point.13 This essay considers two books about the current social
welfare policy discourse which adopt the latter view of poverty and
criticize the former. Joel F. Handler14 and Mark Robert RanklS
pose similar questions in order to expose the illusory "logic" of the
current welfare reform rhetoric. They ask, "Why [is] there so much
anger [against welfare recipients] with so little evidence to justify
it?"16 "Why does society cling to the basic assumptions that underlie welfare policy when it is so clear that they do not comport with
reality? . . . What is this incessant need to blame the victim?"
(Handler, p. 8).
Both books address these questions, but they do so from different perspectives. Handler criticizes the current Democratic and
Republican proposals to reform the welfare system. He argues that
these proposals affirm "majoritarian values through the creation of
deviants" and hold "[t]he poor ... hostage to make sure that the
rest of us behave" (Handler, p. 9). Rank functions as ethnographer,
providing a true sense of welfare recipients and proving that they
are "not that different from you or me - no better, no worse."17
differences in the beliefs imbedded in the perception of each group." Vincene Verdun, If the
Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REV. 597,
610 (1993); see also KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE PoLmCS OF MOTHERHOOD 158-91
(1984) (discussing the different belief structures or "world views" of opponents and proponents of full reproductive freedom for women); Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MrcH. L. REv. 2073, 2083-84 (1989) (describing the "perceptual fault lines [or]
different descriptions of events that grow from different experiences and different
resonances" at work in legal storytelling); fatricia J. Williams, A/chemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 410-11 (1987)
(telling a story about how a difference in perceptions between herself and her sister led one
to see a road as black while the other saw it as purple).
12. Such individuals explain poverty and welfare dependency as a function of individual
attitudes, motivation, or culture. Rank, pp. 25-29.
13. Rank recognizes four structural theories of poverty: (1) Marxism; (2) dual labormarket theory; (3) functionalism; and (4) the "Big Brother" theory. See Rank, pp. 30-34.
14. Richard C. Maxwell Professor of Law at the University of California at Los Angeles
School of Law.
15. Associate Professor in the George Warren Brown School of Social Work at Washington University, St. Louis.
16. Rank, p. 1. Rank begins his book with the following story about his conversation with
an individual irritated by an editorial Rank wrote about the myths of welfare reform:
How in the world could I write such nonsense when everyone knew that most welfare
recipients were black, on the dole for years at a time, living the good life, and so on.
"But how," I asked, "do you know that?" "Just look around!" he replied. He had no
need for the data I used to argue my points; for him it was obvious that people on
welfare were good-for-nothing parasites.
Rank, p. 1.
17. Rank, p. 4. According to Rank, this is "[p]erhaps the most salient theme to emerge
from [his] study." Rank, p. 172. For other ethnographic studies of poor populations, see
JONATIIAN KozoL, AMAZING GRACE: THE LrvEs OF CHILDREN AND THE CONSCIENCE OF A
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He sets his sights on the much-maligned welfare queen, determined
to challenge her primacy in mainstream social welfare policy discourse.18 Read together, these authors provide an interlocking explanation and critique of the current mainstream social welfare
policy proposals.19
The remainder of this essay is divided into five parts. Part I
considers the marriage of morality and law within the context of
social welfare policy, in general, and the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, in particular. Part II discusses
Handler's views of the welfare reform "Consensus" and "the culture of poverty" thesis it embraces as evidenced by the assumptions
on which the Consensus is based. Part III focuses on the Consensus' "work versus welfare" paradigm and seeks to expose the myths
on which this paradigm relies. These myths include not only that
welfare recipients do not work for wages but also that if welfare
recipients are forced to work for wages, then their economic wellbeing will be enhanced significantly as illustrated by "successful"
welfare-to-work programs as implemented by states such as California. Part IV analyzes both the Consensus' desire to modify the be""
havior of welfare recipients and Rank's claims that such a desire is
unwarranted because, contrary to popular belief, the poor are no
different from the non-poor. Finally, it concludes with some
thoughts about the stigma of negritude and its impact on the apparent "logic" of the Consensus, its assumptions and its proposed welfare reforms.
I.

MORALITY, LAW, AND WELFARE

Social welfare policy arises at the intersection of morality with
law and policy - the point at which both Handler and Rank center
NATION (1995); ELLIOT LIEBOW, TALLY'S CORNER! A, STUDY OF NEGRO STREETCORNER
MEN (1967).
18. Rank asserts that "the common stereotypes surrounding welfare" support the belief
that "most recipients are minorit[y women who are] on welfare ... for long periods oftime
[who] have more children to get higher welfare payments." Rank, p. 142; see also Rank, p. 2
(describing the stereotypical welfare recipient as a "good-for-nothing freeloader who drives a
Cadillac, uses Food Stamps to buy sirloin steak, or watches soap operas all day").
19. They define the mainstream according to their shared view of the debate about welfare reform - that is, as occurring in the largely partisan and ideological universe occupied
by liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans. I concur with this definition because it
excludes radical outliers. Cf. MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING PooR: FROM THE wAR
ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFARE 79-123 (1989) (discussing the debate about welfare
in terms that include radicals); Ruth Margaret Buchanan, Context, Continuity, and Difference
in Poverty Law Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv. 999, 1020-25 (1994) (discussing poverty
lawyers and their lawyering in terms of liberal legalists, radicals, and critics); Lisa A. Crooms,

Stepping into the Projects: Lawmaking, Storytelling and Practicing the Politics of Identification, 1 MICH. J. RAcE & L. 1 (1996) (defining the mainstream in terms that, while not synonymous with white, recognize the central role of the ideology of white supremacy to the
mainstream's principles).
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their analyses of the current mainstream. welfare-reform debate.20
Focusing on the AFDC21 program, Handler characterizes the mainstream's proposals to reform the program as a series of "right-flanking" moves by political liberals and conservatives at both the
national and the state level out of which emerged bipartisan consensus.22 Both authors recognize the public ambivalence towards
AFDC, an ambivalence that reflects the perceived immorality of
AFDC recipients and their apparent unwillingness to abide by the
social norms of mainstream life (Handler, pp. 90-94). This ambivalence leads to policy initiatives designed to make individuals more
responsible but that pay little attention to the structural forces that
prevent the poor from escaping poverty.23
Handler predicts that the current round of reforms, the latest
installment in an ongoing struggle, will meet a fate no different
from that of its misguided and ill-conceived predecessors (Handler,
p. 112). The mainstream's discourse reiterates the same themes, issues, and choices raised over the centuries as societies have considered their obligations to care for those members unable to provide
for their own needs.24 In most instances the resolution of this issue
becomes inextricably linked to morality as societies seek to uphold
the obligation of each man to support himself and his family. This
20. As Handler notes, "although contemporary welfare policies are often described in
so-called objective terms - labor markets, wage rates, incentives, demographics - they are
heavily laden with moral judgments." Handler, p. 30.
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-687 (1988). AFDC is "a $23 billion federal-state program supporting 14.5 million people, 9.5 million of them children. It is supplemented by food stamps,
public housing, child care and nutrition programs." Washington Can't Wash Its Hands of
Welfare, USA ToDAY, Aug. l, 1995, at lOA.
22. See Handler, p. 3. Despite the intense bi-partisanship on the surface of the mainstream's discourse, members of both parties have recognized the consensus to which Handler
refers. See Pamela M. Prah, Clinton Vetoes Welfare Package; Lawmakers Look to 1996 to Try
Again, Daily Labor Report (BNA) 7 (Jan. 11, 1996) (reporting Republican criticism of Clinton as "a typical Democrat, a very liberal protector of the nation's failed welfare system");
Welfare Farewell, THE NATION, 809, 811-12 (1995) (detailing current partisan wrangling over
congressional welfare reform proposals). For example, President Clinton recently acknowledged the Consensus when he stated, "Congress and I are near agreement on sweeping welfare reform. We agree on time limits, tough work requirements and the toughest possible
child-support enforcement." Clinton, supra note 1. Michigan Governor John Engler, one of
the most visible Republicans at the forefront of welfare reform, now supports Clinton's proposals to provide to "poor people services like child care and transportation while requiring
them to work." Jason DeParle,Aidfrom an Enemy of the Welfare State, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
1996, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4. To many, the Consensus is lamentable. Handler, for one,
decries the dawn of the "new" Democrat Handler, pp. 37-38; see, e.g., Dirk Johnson, With
Popular Issues, Clinton Strikes Chord, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1996, at A18 (quoting Michael
Bellows, a social worker from Chicago, expressing his concern that "Clinton no longer represents true Democratic ideology ..• [b]ut for liberals like me, he's all we've got").
23. See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 9.
24. Handler marks the passage of England's Statute of Labourers in 1349 as the beginning of social security. See Handler, chapter 1. Rank marks it with the Elizabethan Poor
Law of 1601 which was the start of outdoor, that is, not institutionalized, relief. See Rank,
chapter 2.

May 1996]

Welfare

1959

link has grown especially strong in the United States, where "the
notion that there are no socioeconomic systemic flaws that produce
poverty" is "[f]undamental to our cultural order."25 Indeed, the
"enthusiastic[ ] celebrat[ion of] ... the Horatio Algers, the Abraham Lincolns, or the Clarence Thomases of this country" seems
crucial to maintaining our collective faith in "the American dream
... of opportunity" (Rank, pp. 200-01). In this context "individual
flaws merely produce the appearance of system failure," and people
become scapegoats for conditions and circumstances largely beyond
their control.26 Those who do not succeed are thought to deserve
the punitive measures designed to make them conform (Rank, p.
171). Their apparent immorality permits policy makers to propose
draconian and arguably illegal measures in the name of reforming
their "deviant" and intolerable ways. Handler observes, however,
that despite these efforts to reform welfare, "for the vast majority
of [AFDC recipients] life will go on much as before, unless dramatic changes take place in America's labor markets and the larger
environment."27
II.

HANDLER'S CONSENSUS AND THE "CULTURE OF POVERTY"

Handler's work confronts four "key assumptions" about the nature of poverty and its cures: (1) welfare dependency is a moral
issue; (2) welfare destroys the work ethic; (3) welfare should modify
individual behavior to comport with mainstream norms; and (4) reform efforts should be directed at adults (Handler, p. 4). For Handler, these assumptions best capture the apparent "logic" of the
Consensus position as well as its false dichotomy between work and
welfare.2s The Consensus not" only frames the issue as one of welfare versus work but also diagnoses a "culture of poverty" that
drives the poor.29
25. Larry Cata Backer, Welfare Reform at the Limit: The Futility of "Ending Welfare as
We Know It," 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 339, 341 (1995); see also Rank, p. 200.
26. Backer, supra note 25, at 341.
27. Handler, p. 112; see also Rothman, supra note 9.
28. Chapter 3 of Handler's book specifically addresses the problems associated with the
false dichotomy between welfare and work.
29. Oscar Lewis developed the culture-of-poverty thesis in a series of works based on the
experiences of poor Puerto Ricans. This thesis carried with it radical implications because
Lewis called for efforts to organize poor Latinos to overcome the mindset that they developed as a coping mechanism for seemingly inevitable poverty. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 19,
at 16-19. In the 1960s, social conservatives misappropriated Lewis's explanation of poverty
and adapted it to their agenda. Lewis's theory allowed them to blame the poor for their
pathology of poverty. See id. at 19-35; cf. Rank, p. 175. Lewis apparently appreciated the
potential for such misappropriation. He warned "that my findings might be misinterpreted
or used to justify prejudices and negative stereotypes .•• which, unfortunately, are still held
by some Americans." KATZ, supra note 19, at 19 (quoting OsCAR LEWIS, LAV10A: A PuERTo RICAN FAMILY IN TifE CuLTURE OF POVERTY - SAN JUAN AND NEW YORK xiii
(1966)).
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The culture-of-poverty theory, which preoccupies the current
mainstream discourse, views the black ghetto underclass as the metaphor for all the problems of welfare. Specifically, the image of the
black single mother living in a devastated inner-city community
:figures prominently in the mainstream welfare reform discourse.3o
As Rank comments, "Welfare dependency is viewed as part of a
cultural process in which children learn from their parents and from
their surrounding environment that relying on welfare, bearing children out of wedlock, dropping out of school, and so on, are acceptable behaviors" (Rank, p. 175). Relying heavily on this theory, the
Consensus appears to blame the mere receipt of AFDC benefits for
crime, juvenile delinquency, substance abuse, AIDS, and the other
social ills most common to underclass communities.31 Such imagery
makes the explicit identification of the race of the poor unnecessary; poverty in its most heinous form is presumptively black
(Handler, pp. 3-4).
Both Handler and Rank criticize the bipartisan Consensus for
its failure to frame the issue correctly. As Handler sees it, the
problems of underclass communities follow from poverty rather
than welfare. ·In his view, the eradication of poverty requires more
than.human capital development and equal opportunity; an explanation of poverty must go beyond individual irresponsibility and
moral failure. 32 Rather, that explanation requires an understanding
of what Rank calls "structural vulnerability" (Rank, p. 180). Structural vulnerability measures the structural impact of both human
capital deficiencies and irrational market barriers, such as discrimination on the basis of gender, on the class mobility of the least advantaged members of society.33 It seeks to avoid the problems
associated with other theories that ignore "the important influence
of larger factors that lie beyond people's immediate control[, without] suggest[ing] that individual characteristics are irrelevant"
(Rank, p. 171). As Rank explains, individual characteristics are
"simply best understood within a wider context" (Rank, p. 171).
30. Handler, pp. 35-36; see also Rank, pp. 27-30 (discussing the cultural explanations of
poverty embraced by Daniel Patrick Moynihan and William Julius Wilson in which inner·city
black communities are central).
31. Handler, p. 3; see generally Rank, pp. 58·61 (describing the physical consequences of
poverty such as disease, crime, and acute health problems).
32. As Ruth Margaret Buchanan observes, the "debate over whether poor people are
lazy and immoral or merely lack social opportunities is an example of how complex social
dilemmas are misleadingly reduced to a simple question of structural versus individual responsibility." Buchanan, supra note 19, at 1008. In chapter 3, Handler argues that the problem is not one of welfare versus work but one of poverty which persists even for those who
work. He concludes that the focus on welfare is misguided and that instead we must explore
what prevents some workers from earning a living wage. Handler, pp. 39-44.
33. Rank, pp. 176-85. Like Rank's structural vulnerability theory, Handler's analysis of
poverty identifies both structural problems and human capital deficiencies as significant.
Handler, pp. 35-39.
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Handler views poverty and welfare dependency as outcomes of
the deterioration of family income ·between 1973 and 1990
(Handler, pp. 34-35). He explains how this deterioration has led to
an increase in the numbers of both multiple job holders and working household members, all of whom strive to support a family. 34
He describes how it has affected family structure by increasing the
number of households headed by women who hold the primary responsibility for the financial support of their families. 35 Consequently, more women have entered the labor market, which is
hampered by irrational barriers such as gender discrimination.36
Indeed, "[m]ost women are ... still segregated in low-paying, traditionally female jobs in clerical, sales and service occupations."37 As
such, factors beyond their control severely limit their earning potential. That is, "low wages are linked to the skills and jobs that
women usually hold."38 Although low income does not determine
family behavior, poverty has proven the "most powerful predictor
of ... harmful behavioral consequences" (Handler, p. 36). This explains why female-headed families disproportionately fill the ranks
of the poor and play a crucial role in the rhetoric of welfare reform.

III.

WORK VERSUS WELFARE

'

Handler concerns himself primarily with the link between
waged work and welfare in the current mainstream social welfare
discourse. He concludes that neither mandatory waged work proposals nor time-limited benefits will succeed for the simple reason
that they fail to address the causes of poverty. According to
Handler, this society can remedy poverty only by creating jobs that
34. Handler, p. 35; see also Rank, pp. 43-44 (describing the conditions that lead married
couples to welfare); FAMIUES & WORK INST., WOMEN: THE NEW PROVIDERS 31 (1995) (observing that, although "the notion persists that women's wages are only supplementary and
provide discretionary income ... the economic viability of many households is dependent on
women's earnings").
35. Handler, p. 35; see also Rank, pp. 42-43, 79 (discussing the effects of poverty on family structures and the strains poverty puts on marriages, many of which dissolve).
36. See Handler, p. 35; Rank, pp. 42-43; Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989); Mary E. Becker,
Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual and Structural Remedies for Racial and Sexual
Disadvantages in Employment, 19 GEo. LJ. 1659, 1659 (1991) (discussing sex discrimination
in employment and gender-based wage differentials as "one aspect of the systemic subordination of women and people of color to whites and men, particularly white men, under rules,
practices and standards made by white men and preserving their power"). See generally
Barbara Crossette, U.N. Documents Inequities for Women as World Forum Nears, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 1995, at A3 (noting that despite the halving of "gender gaps in human capabilities" over the last 20 years, "women overwhelmingly still lack access to economic and
political opportunities"); Rothman, supra note 9 (discussing poverty in the context of factors
such as discrimination).
37. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, WORKING WOMEN CouNT!: A REPORT
TO THE NATION 23 (1994).
38. Id.
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pay living wages.39 Until it does so, public assistance will remain a
necessity.40
As Handler notes, to assume that AFDC recipients do not work
for wages presupposes that AFDC pays recipients enough to meet
their basic needs. This, however, ignores the fact that the program
exists to reduce the misery associated with poverty rather than to
remedy it.41 As Rank observes:
[p]erhaps most apparent when one listens to welfare recipients describe their daily lives and routines is the constant economic struggle
that they face. This includes difficulties paying monthly bills, not having enough food, worrying about health care costs, and so on. The
amount of income received each month is simply insufficient to cover
all these necessary expenses.42

This struggle presents a significant dilemma for AFDC recipients.
On the one hand, if they work and report their income, their AFDC
checks will shrink. Reporting thus defeats the purpose of working
- that is, to increase the amount of money with which to meet the
family's basic needs.43 As Kelly McGrath explained,
There's people that [work] and get paid cash and don't report it. And
they probably don't report that their family members are helping 'em.
They wouldn't say, "Yeah my mom gave me a hundred dollars last
month." I mean they just wouldn't do that because it's hard enough
39. Any program to move people off of public assistance must create jobs. Unfortunately, those with only a high school diploma face dim prospects. According to a recent
study by the MacArthur Foundation, an estimated 140,000 jobs will be available in the Chicago area in the next ten years. One-half of those jobs will require a high school education
but will not pay a living wage. See Thomas Geoghegan, The State of the Worker, N.Y. T1MES,
Jan. 25, 1996, at A21.
40. Although Handler makes some passing comments about the possibility of reconceptualizing work to include domestic caretaking, he apparently rejects this idea. See Handler,
pp. 32-33. At least one of Rank's interviewees appeared to support the idea of domestic
caretaking as an economically valuable activity when she noted:
I mean if you got a family, what're you talkin' about lazy?! A woman is on [welfare]
because she's got some children. And if she's at home and she's doin' for her family,
how the hell is she lazy? ... [T]o me that's not laziness. If she's doing a good job at that
•.. that's not laziness!
Rank, pp. 122-23.
41. Susan Mayer & Christopher Jencks, War on Poverty: No Apologies, Please, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 1995, at A29.
42. Rank, p. 51; see also Kathryn Edin & Christopher Jencks, Reforming Welfare, in RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS 204 (Christopher Jencks
ed., 1992).
The story of Mary Summers, a fifty-one-year-old divorced mother of two teenage daugh·
ters, makes these difficulties all too real. Summers
receives $544 a month from AFDC and $106 a month [in] Food Stamps. After paying
$280 for rent (which includes heat and electricity), she and her [two] daughters are left
with $370 a month (including Food Stamps) to live on. This comes to approximately $12
a day, or $4 per family member.
Rank, p. 52. Summers does not receive AFDC because she prefers welfare to wages; rather,
"she ha[s] been unable to find work for two years." Rank, p. 52; see also Rank, pp. 54-56
(describing how recipients make ends meet).
43. Edin & Jencks, supra note 42, at 204.
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to survive on the aid. When you get extra, you don't want 'em to take
it away from you. And that's what they do.44
On the other hand, if they work and do not report their income,

they increase their ability to make ends meet, albeit at a level below
the poverty line. Therefore, "[t]he only way most welfare recipients
can make ends meet ... is to supplement their welfare checks without telling the department." 45 That is, they must "lie and cheat in
order to survive. "46
Moreover, most of the poor occupy the position esteemed by
the mainstream - that is, they work and do not receive AFDC.
What the mainstream does not see, at least in the context of welfare
reform, is that millions of working people cannot lift themselves out
of poverty. As Handler notes, in 1993, the 13.6 million welfare recipients accounted for only about one-third of those living in poverty (Handler, p. 34). Thus, even if the coming reforms achieve
their stated objectives and move all AFDC recipients from welfare
to work, there is little likelihood that these workers will earn
enough to meet their basic needs. As Handler notes, "the real
earnings of the less-skilled, less-educated workers have declined
substantially since 1973," and the numbers of working poor people
have increased in step (Handler, pp. 39-40). He asks, "if the problem is welfare and the vast majority of the poor are working and
not on welfare, then what is the problem of work?" (Handler, p.
39). Forced off welfare and into the low-waged jobs for which they
qualify, AFDC recipients will confront that "problem of work."
Clearly, "requiring welfare recipients to work ... does little to improve their economic well-being," and the mainstream's reform
proposals do little to address the phenomenon (Handler, p. 88).
Finally, as Handler observes, the mainstream political rhetoric
seems inconsistent: it advocates both cutting costs as well as the
need to provide AFDC recipients with the resources necessary to
put them on the path to economic independence.47 Rather than
address the real financial requirements of the capital-intensive programs needed to remedy the varied and interlocking causes of poverty, Handler contends that the Consensus exaggerates the
44. Rank, p. 119. Ironically, the mainstream fails to recognize that this activity comports
with family values. Recipients who rely on relatives often come from close families that
"take care of each other if anybody has a problem." Rank, pp. 70-71.
45. Edin & Jencks, supra note 42, at 204; see also Rank, pp. 169-70 (noting that in spite of
the impact of low-waged work on the level of family income, "many on welfare work or
eventually will find work").
46. Edin & Jencks, supra note 42, at 205.
47. See DeParle, supra note 22 (noting that "[w]ork programs almost always cost more
than sending checks," and that "the financing of the Republicans' ••• bill is sufficiently short
that fewer than 15 states will meet their employment goals"); Rothman, supra note 9 (characterizing work programs as "invariably more expensive than simply providing welfare payments" and "counter to the ••. aim of creating cheap labor").
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moderate success of state demonstration projects and wishes to
limit the role of the federal government to encourage more state
experimentation.4s
To underscore this claim, Handler lays out the Consensus' views
about the success of California's Greater Avenues to Independence, or "GAIN," program:
[T]he basic idea [behind GAIN] is that all eligible recipients are to
participate in programs until they become employed or are off
AFDC. Mothers whose children are three years or older are eligible.... Recipients undergo orientation and appraisal before they are
slotted. Those with work experience, for example, go immediately
into job search. Others might go to remedial education. Employment
plans are developed for those unable to find jobs, and work-for-relief
is provided for those who complete the plan but fail to find a job
within ninety days. Work-for-relief can last up to a year, and then the
process begins again.49

The localized administration of GAIN leads to uneven results
across counties. As Handler notes, "because GAIN depends on an
extensive network of county services and counties vary in the availability of these services and the willingness and ability of the services to cooperate with welfare departments, there is wide variation
in the operation of the program" (Handler, p. 67). Handler concludes that misconceptions about the performance of the GAIN
program in one California county guide much of the rhetoric about
the potential of mandatory work programs.
To prove his point, Handler analyzed Manpower Development
Research Corporation (MDRC) data regarding the program's performance in Riverside, Alameda, and Los Angeles counties. Riverside County, with both rural and urban areas, had a high percentage
of AFDC recipients who were minorities without basic education
(Handler, p. 68). The Riverside program stressed employment and
an inexpensive job search based on a philosophy that "a low-paying
entry-level job was better than no job at all and could lead to a
better job" (Handler, p. 68). In Alameda County a large proportion of long-term AFDC recipients were African-American innercity residents, many of whom also lacked a basic education. Alameda's program, however, emphasized "basic education and train48. As of August 1995, the Clinton administration had "approved 36 demonstrations in
32 states ••. 23 states require work, 17 limit benefits, 27 have increased earned income
AFDC recipients can keep, 14 have strengthened child.support enforcement and 25 stress
parental responsibility." Washington, supra note 21; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (1988) (permitting the Secretary of Health and Human Services to waive certain requirements and thus
to allow states to experiment with novel welfare programs); Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057
(9th Cir. 1994) (holding that§ 1315(a) waivers for welfare experiments are subject to judicial
review).
49. Handler, pp. 65-66; see also Ann VanDePol & Katherine E. Meiss, California's

GAIN: Greater Avenues or a Narrow Path? The Politics and Policies of Welfare Reform and
AFDC Work Programs in the 1980s, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 49, 69 (1987).
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ing to prepare recipients for higher-paying jobs" (Handler, p. 68).
Finally, Los Angeles County held one-third of California's welfare
recipients, including a large inner-city, long-term AFDC population. It also contained both the highest percentages of non-English
speakers and minorities and the lowest percentage of recipients
with recent work experience. Its program enrolled only those "in
need of basic education" (Handler, p. 68).
Having discussed the demographics of the three counties as well
as the differences between their GAIN programs, Handler compares the performance of the Riverside County program with that
of the programs in Alameda and Los Angeles counties. He then
examines the performance of Riverside County in terms of its effect
on the earnings of program participants. In so doing, Handler exposes the error of relying on the Riverside County experience as
"the standard-bearer or model ... for proposed [national] changes"
(Handler, p. 67).
As the MDRC data demonstrate, the Riverside County program outperformed the Alameda and Los Angeles County programs in terms of net cost,50 benefit-cost ratios51 and earnings
effect.52 But, as MDRC cautioned, the different results across
counties suggest that different counties must implement different
combinations of strategies. Many social welfare policy pundits,
however, appear unwilling to heed MDRC's advice. Instead, they
talk as if "the Riverside program could be replicated elsewhere"
(Handler, p. 75). They ignore the fact that Florida tried unsuccessfully to implement the Riverside approach statewide in 1987.53
Without an appreciation for the importance of local particularities
to program success, federal welfare reform will fail much as Florida
did in 1987.
Even if other states and counties could replicate the Riverside
County program, the MDRC notes that GAIN "was only moderately successful in moving people off welfare and out of poverty by
the end of three years" (Handler, p. 75). As for the earnings effect,
50. The five-year average net cost was less than $2000 per recipient in Riverside and
more than $5500 in both Alameda and Los Angeles counties. The difference reflected, in
large part, the relatively large numbers of long-term recipients in Alameda and Los Angeles
counties engaged in education and job-training programs. See Handler, p. 70.
51. While Riverside County experienced a gain of $2.84 for each $1 illvested, both Alameda and Los Angeles counties experienced losses. See Handler, p. 70.
52. The MDRC data indicate that five of the six counties that participated in the GAIN
program experienced an average income effect of $923 per experimental subject over a fiveyear period. Riverside County recipients gained the most - $1900 - while Los Angeles
County recipients suffered an average net loss of $1561 over the same period. See Handler,
p. 73.
53. This is not meant to suggest that particular jurisdictions cannot replicate the Riverside
program. Indeed, it appears that in another county with demographics similar to those of
Riverside County, the program might enjoy the same moderate success.
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Riverside County participants increased their income by an average
of $3113 for three years, or approximately $1037 each year
(Handler, p. 69). Thus, their earnings increased an average of $84
per month, or less than $20 per week.s4 Handler interprets the
small earnings effect as evidence of the control group's work activities (Handler, p. 70). This conclusion, however, follows only if the
control group's reported income included employment income - a
highly unlikely condition. Indeed, the Edin and Jencks study on
which Handler relies argues that neither the earned income of
AFDC recipients nor their employment factor into mainstream social welfare discourse because the vast majority of recipients do not
report their additional income.ss This flaw, however, does not
prove fatal to Handler's analysis. The point remains: the hype
about programs such as the Riverside County program finds little
support in their actual performance.s6 Ironically, as Handler notes,
the real experiences under GAIN, excluding Riverside County, resemble those under the current federal JOBS program that the
Consensus has declared an abysmal failure.s1
IV.

BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION, SAMENESS/DIFFERENCE,
AND POWER

In the context of measures designed to modify the behavior of
individual AFDC recipients, the Consensus focuses again on state
experiments, but its more conservative members do so in order to
justify the federal conditions they wish to place on block grants to
the states.ss Their commitment to such an authoritarian agenda betrays their pledge to end big government and highlights their intention that the federal government control the social behavior of
AFDC recipients.
54. See Handler, p. 69. After the reduction in AFDC benefits resulting from recipients'
increased earnings, the earnings effect of the program decreases to an average of $52 per
month. See Handler, pp. 69-70.
55. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
56. See Handler, pp. 67-85; see also VanDePol & Meiss, supra note 49, at 80-82 (criticizing GAIN as doing little more than pushing AFDC recipients into low-wage jobs and as not
increasing their financial resources for their families' basic needs).
57. See Handler, p. 76; see also Mayer & Jencks, supra note 41, at A29 (noting that
"[m]illions of Americans, including a majority of legislators," believe that social programs do
not work).
58. See Handler, pp. 133-35. Both Democrats and Republicans have opposed the strings
attached to block grants under the House of Representative's Personal Responsibility Act.
Democrats, who oppose block grants, tend to favor increased state and local control through
a streamlined version of the current Department of Health and Human Services waiver process. Republicans, especially at the state and local level, support block grants "with virtually
no strings attached." See, e.g., DeParle, supra note 22; see also Herbert, supra note 8, at A17
{"The fundamental principle that our national Government is the protector of last resort is
what is at stake as we give .•. block grants to the states and tell them to go ahead and do
whatever they want." (quoting Marian Wright Edelman)). .
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The experiences of the Wisconsin welfare recipients interviewed
for Rank's book, from applying for welfare to leaving the rolls, provides additional evidence that the Consensus' current reform proposals are misguided and sure to fail. Rank makes clear that the
Consensus' prototype does not represent the entire recipient population but only a small percentage of it.59 Accordingly, he views the
potential damage from the current reforms as associated with their
overbreadth. The Consensus tailored its current reforms after this
prototype, which represents very few actual welfare recipients. In
Rank's opinion the Consensus should not treat the rest of them like
the black, inner-city single mothers with whom it appears most
concerned.
Rank's strategy focuses on the "sameness" of the poor. He
seems to believe that this approach de-emphasizes the alleged deviance and difference of the poor and underscores the structural vulnerability their poverty represents (Rank, pp. 180-81). He
encourages his readers to empathize with public assistance recipients, in the hope that such empathy will reveal the arbitrariness of
this perceived difference.
Unfortunately, Rank's chosen paradigm impairs his ability to
evaluate the potential injury of the proposed reforms in a way that
strengthens the universality of his structural vulnerability theory.
His focus on difference and sameness obscures the questions of
power raised by issues of poverty.60 Conceding, as Rank does, that
poverty is largely a structural phenomenon requires an analysis beyond the sameness of the poor and Rank's audience.
Professor Catharine MacKinnon's dominance approach may
provide a better paradigm for this project. In her essay Difference
and Dominance: - On Sex Discrimination, 61 Professor MacKinnon
criticizes mainstream feminists who embrace the sameness-difference paradigm to analyze questions of sex equality. According to
59. See Rank, p. 49; see also Handler, p. 34.
60. Professor Patricia Williams similarly criticizes the politics of the recent Million Man
March held in Washington D.C. She viewed the event as a time for Black men to insist,
" 'We exist!' 'We are different!' and 'We are good!' " Patricia J. Williams, The Million Man
Atonement: Different Drummer Please, Marchers!, 261 THE NATION, 493, 494 (1995). She
contends that such expressions incorrectly frame the issue and fail to recognize the problems
of stereotypes that seem to make "atonement" the private domain of Black men. See id.
Williams envisions a realigned and inclusive day of atonement in which
Bob Packwood could join, marching side by side with Ben Chavis, both apologizing up a
storm[.] Where Rush Limbaugh and Mark Fuhrman could weep for their sins with
Marion Barry; where Pat Buchanan and Louis Farrakhan could jump up shouting with
the ecumenical power of divine redemption. In which Clinton came down from his
mount and atoned for Lani Guinier, while Jesse Helms climbed up out of his burrow and
let Clinton appoint her to the Justice Department. In which Charles Murray and Dinesh
D'Souza confronted the Black Child Within and had transformational experiences.
Id.
61. CATHARINE A. MAcKINNoN, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32 (1987).
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MacKinnon, "[a]pproaching sex discrimination ... as if sex questions are difference questions and equality questions are sameness
questions ... provides two ways ... to hold women to a male standard and call that sex equality."62 She argues that such an approach
leads to the perception that "demands for [sex] equality [ask] to
have it both ways: the same when we are the same, different when
we are different."63 In employment, for example, many feminists
advocate a gender and sex neutrality that entitles those women who
can conform to the male norm of full-time employment to equality
of opportunity.64 Accordingly, they de-emphasize those things that
make women different from men such as child bearing and child
rearing because these differences may justify differential treatment.65 Other feminists, however, focus on those sex and gender
differences and seek to have them accommodated in the workplace
through measures such as maternity leave and pregnancy benefits.66
MacKinnon advocates "an alternative approach" in which "[sex]
equality . . . is a question of the distribution of power" and
"[g]ender is ... a question of power, specifically of male supremacy
and female subordination."67 Rather than avoid confronting the
presumed legitimacy of the status quo, as the sameness/difference
approach does, MacKinnon's "dominance approach ... is critical of
reality."68 Therefore, it criticizes feminists on both sides of the
sameness-difference divide. To those obsessed with sameness,
MacKinnon says we must abandon gender neutrality because it
"has mostly gotten men the benefit of those few things women have
historically had." 69 She asks "[w]hy should you have to be the same
as a man to get what a man gets simply because he is one?" 70 She
warns those who celebrate difference not to "affirm[ ] what we have
been, which necessarily is what we have been permitted, as if it is
women's, ours, possessive." 71 To MacKinnon, these feminists make
"it seem as though [female] attributes, with their consequences, re62. Id. at 34. MacKinnon notes that questions of sameness and difference, in this context,
carry with them a male referent This establishes maleness as the norm and fails to appreciate that women are as different from men as men are different from women. See id. at 37.
63. Id. at 39.
64. See id. at 37; see also Abrams, supra note 36, at 1220-26.
65. See MACKINNON, supra note 61, at 34-36.
66. See id. at 34-36, 242 n.18.
67. Id. at 40.
68. Id.

69. Id. at 35. For example, the law of custody and divorce has been transformed by gender neutrality so that "men (have] an equal chance at custody of children and at alimony."
Id.
70. Id. at 37.
71. Id. at 39.
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ally are somehow ours, rather than what male supremacy has attributed to us for its own use."72
Rank's sameness-difference paradigm suffers from flaws similar
to those of the feminist sameness-difference paradigm. By focusing
on sameness to dispel myths of difference, Rank obscures the nature of the entitlement at issue. Will the problems commonly
thought to be associated with welfare dependency be remedied if all
AFDC recipients work for wages? In Rank's own estimation the
answer is "no": the structural vulnerability of the recipient population will place them in the same position occupied by the working
poor who do not rely on AFDC. The work experiences of his interviewees support this conclusion.73
Rather than be viewed as an issue of sameness or difference,
poverty may more appropriately be conceptualized as an issue of
power and its distribution. As such, we should assess any proposed
remedy based on its impact on the power disparity between the
poor and the wealthy.74 MacKinnon's "dominance approach," with
its focus on power disparities and abuses, may help clarify a more
promising poverty policy than one based on similarities between
the poor and the nonpoor. Also, a power-based analysis may prove
more compatible with Rank's theory of structural vulnerability than
one based on the sameness-difference paradigm, as Rank's theory
72. Id. Although MacKinnon's approach may prove better suited to Rank's articulated
task, I want to make clear that I have reservations about her approach, all of which stem
from the limited nature of her analysis as it relates to discrimination suffered by black women
and her overly optimistic view of the Jaw's treatment of race. First, MacKinnon has been
criticized, and rightfully so, for her tendency to resort to essentialism. See Angela P. Harris,
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990). Second,
MacKinnon claims that courts during the sixties implicitly applied a dominance model to
questions of racial justice. She bases this claim on Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), in
which the Supreme Court struck down Virginia's anti-mis~genation statute as a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See MACKINNON, supra note 61, at 42 n.35. MacKinnon reads
that decision as "based on the realization that the condition of Blacks ... was not fundamentally a matter of rational or irrational differentiation on the basis of race but was fundamentally a matter of white supremacy, under which racial differences became invidious as a
consequence." Id. at 42. Although Loving characterized the Virginia statute as "designed to
maintain White supremacy," the Court had a limited vision of both this supremacy and its
manifestations. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. It embraced race neutrality as the proper remedy
and failed to recognize the institutionalized and systemic nature of white supremacy and its
accompanying oppression. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 162, 173-75 (1994). Finally, MacKinnon claims that the abolition of slavery meant that
"no amount of group difference mattered anymore." MACKINNON, supra note 61, at 44.
Such a conclusion seems ahistorical, and ignores the significance of cases such as Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1898), as well as the black codes or Jim Crow Jaws that included the
very statute struck down in Loving. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVEO:
THE ELUSIVE QuEST FoR RACIAL JUSTICE 169 (1987) (discussing the Supreme Court's apparent unwillingness to consider constitutional challenges to state anti-miscegenation statutes
before its decision in Loving).
73. See Rank, pp. 114-25.
74. Such an approach has the potential to build alliances based on a shared interest of
poor and non-poor to redistribute power more equitably.
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treats poverty as the result of a convergence of different institutionalized oppressions.75
Rank's sameness-difference analysis allows for highly punitive
measures for recipients who resemble the discourse's prototype.
Indeed, he seems to concede that vindictive proposals may be justified for the small percentage of the recipient population that is
poor, black, single, urban-dwelling, and female.76 According to
Rank,
[t]hose who posit cultural reasons for welfare dependency ... are generally referring to severely depressed inner-city areas.... Had I focused exclusively upon the inner city, it is certainly possible that I
might have found more evidence of the importance of cultural factors.
Regardless, . . . those living in major metropolitan inner-city areas
constitute a very small percentage of the overall poverty population.

They are simply not representative of most people who are poor and on
welfare. [Rank, p. 175; emphasis added]

Therefore, Rank apparently sees the injury flowing from the mainstream's current reforms as caused by the overinclusiveness of the
punitive measures rather than from the socially constructed meaning of the debate. He decries the apparent willingness of the general public to assume that the discourse's prototype represents all
welfare recipients.
Finally, he introduces the voices of AFDC recipients in terms
that segregate them from the mainstream. As Rank notes, no one
believes the current AFDC program works: "Conservatives worry
that it erodes the work ethic, retards productivity, and rewards the
lazy. Liberals view [it] as incomplete, inadequate, and punitive.
Poor people, who rely on it, find it degrading, demoralizing, and
mean."77 In Rank's world, the poor are neither liberal nor conservative, and neither liberals nor conservatives are poor. Rank
draws unnecessary distinctions between the poor and the nonpoor
in a way that duplicates the historic need for line drawing in social
welfare policy.78 Moreover, his data do not support this division:
the recipients he interviewed spanned the ideological spectrum.
While Chester Peterson echoes the views of the Consensus and believes that AFDC encourages welfare mothers to bear children
(Rank, pp. 142-43), Denise Turner believes that mothers who
75. Recognizing the multiplicity of factors at work requires a multi-axes analysis such as
that advocated by scholars under the rubric of intersectional analysis. See, e.g., Kimberle
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F.
139.
76. See Rank, p. 4.
77. Rank, p. 12 (quoting MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN TIIE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE! A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA ix (1986)).
78. See Rank, pp. 13-25; see also Handler, pp. 10-31 (reviewing the historical develop·
ment of welfare policy).
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choose to stay at home and care for their children deserve assistance (Rank, pp. 122-23).
Unfortunately, Rank's effort to dispel the myths underlying the
current debate falls prey to one of liberalism's contributions to the
debate's moral tone. That is, it adopts the idea of individual responsibility that, in turn, supports the notion that a welfare recipient might deserve the punitive measures proposed by social welfare
policymakers under some circumstances.
V.

SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE STIGMA OF NEGRITUDE

The significance of race and its accompanying social constructs
may help to answer Handler's and Rank's questions.79 The apparent logic of the rhetoric employed in the mainstream's discourse
may be, in large part, a function of race and the role it played in the
War on Poverty. More specifically, the post-1964 policy of the
Johnson administration sought to respond to the demands of the
movements for civil rights and black liberation.80 The Wat on Poverty shifted from the primarily white, rural, and passive poverty that
caught the attention of the Kennedy administration to the primarily
black, urban, and aggressive poverty represented by urban rebellions such as the Watts uprisings in 1965.81 Poverty became a black
issue in the context of a civil-rights agenda conceptualized in largely
middle-class terms and a black liberation agenda firmly committed
to the perpetuation of the patriarchy.82 The country's discomfort
with racial issues, many of which remain unresolved, helped to create the "us-versus-them" paradigm in which "us" denotes normalcy
while "them" indicates deviance. Blackness became a proxy for
poverty and justified the stigma that attached to those who needed
public assistance. The explicit link between blackness and social
welfare policy means that the stigma historically associated with
79. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 8, at 140 (characterizing the War on Poverty as an attempt "to overcome the racial barriers of the New Deal legacy" in which "[f]ederal policies
to aid the poor quickly became linked to the civil rights movement as civil rights organizations endorsed and undertook welfare programs that targeted African-American poor").
81. See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 19, at 1017 (noting that "growing civil unrest and riots
[in northern cities] announced the growing problems of poverty among African-Americans
who had moved from the South but had been unable to find well-paying jobs").
82. Black liberation forces, as represented by nationalist organizations such as the Nation
of Islam, as well as the traditional, old-line civil rights organizations continue to advocate
patriarchal ideals. Last year's Million Man March in Washington, D.C. provides the most
recent and most visible example of such ideals in action. See Donna Franklin, Black
Herstory, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 18, 1995, at A23. See generally Darryl Pinckney, Slouching Toward Washington, N.Y. REv. BooKS, Dec. 21, 1995, at 73-82 (discussing both the Million
Man March and the history of the Nation of Islam).

1972

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 94:1953

public assistance is heightened by the stigma of blackness in the
context of white supremacy.s3
Perhaps both Handler and Rank made conscious decisions not
to consider race as a more significant factor in explaining why the
myths of welfare dependency and poverty underlying the mainstream discourse persist despite data to the contrary. The imagery
of the poor renders them presumptively black, and the relative invisibility of white poverty enhances this image. Unfortunately, both
authors avoid directly confronting these thornier issues. For example, they do not consider the question of whether the decisional
rights held by women on AFDC in the area of reproduction should
be infringed because of their poverty.84 Yet, this is where white
supremacy and the stigma of negritude merge with patriarchy and
the stigma of single motherhood to enhance the perceived immorality of the discourse's prototype - the poor, black, inner-city single
mother. Perhaps this is where not only the answers to the questions
raised by both Handler and Rank lie but also where we must begin
in order to realize a true "age of possibility."

83. Handler's earlier observations support this. He said that: "Throughout our social
history, racial discrimination and nativism have served to affirm dominant values, status, and
power by defining people of color and immigrantS as deviant and degraded." Joel F.
Handler, "Constructing the Political Spectacle": The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 899, 935 (1990).
84. Rank clearly considered this type of imagery. He identifies the view of women on
AFDC as "breeding factories" as one of the myths he sets out to debunk. See Rank, p. 3.
Still, he apparently does not consider race as significant to the imagery. Handler expresses
more discomfort than Rank with the punitive measures advocated by the mainstream. He
notes, "[s]ome reforms could be helpful; most are regulatory and punitive.'' Handler, p. 133.
He endorses increased child support enforcement, but remains apprehensive about denying
benefits to mothers under 18 years old and about family caps. See Handler, pp. 133-34. It
appears from Handler's views about the potential of increased child support enforcement
that he assumes that noncustodial parents of children on welfare can pay child support but
choose not to do so. He ignores the likelihood that these parents are also poor and that their
inability to pay child support results from the decreased wages that Handler himself discussed in chapter 3. See Handler, pp. 32-55.

CONTEXT AND LEGITIMACY IN FEDERAL
INDIANLAW
Philip P. Frickey*
BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE. By Frank Pommersheim. Los Angeles: Uni-

versity of California Press. 1995. Pp. x, 267. $30.
Federal Indian law is perhaps the least respected and most misunderstood area of public law. Although the field produces a
steady diet of cases for the Supreme Court, the Justices have little
love for the topic.1 Tue work of Indian-law scholars and practitioners seems isolated from the more general span of public law scholarship and practice. Indeed, the mere mention of the field is a
conversation stopper for public law generalists of either the academy or the practicing bar.
There are probably many reasons why federal Indian law is out
of the mainstream. Some of them involve fairly typical problems of
public law: unclear - indeed, largely nonexistent - constitutional
text,2 murky doctrines of case law,3 the hydraulic pressure upon
doctrine of evolving social circumstances, and so on. In addition,
there may be some sense on the part of the dominant community
. that the issues involved in federal Indian law are relatively unimportant in the great scheme of things.
Other factors that contribute to the marginalization of the field
are, however, more unusual. Issues concerning the rights of Native
Americans are quite different from those involving other minority
groups defined by race or ethnicity. Indians had sovereignty, land,
and other group rights before their contact with colonizing Europe-

* Faegre & Benson Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. B.A. 1975, University of
Kansas; J.D. 1978, University of Michigan. - Ed. Jim Chen, Daniel Farber, Neil Fulton,
Jeffrey Rutherford, Gerald Torres, and Laura Walvoord provided helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this review essay.
For purposes of full disclosure, I should mention that Frank Pommersheim and I have had
many discussions about federal Indian law and once considered combining our efforts to
produce a book in the field.
1. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism,
and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 382-83 (1993).
2. The Constitution mentions Indians only three times: once to grant Congress the authority to regulate commerce "with the Indian tribes," U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 3, and twice
to exclude "Indians not taxed" from the apportionment formula for the House of Representatives, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 2.
3. For a brief description of the doctrines the courts have applied to federal Indian law,
see Frickey, supra note 1, at 418 n.158.
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ans, and they continue to have sovereignty, land, and other group
rights today. The wrongs colonization perpetrated were group
wrongs rather than individuated injuries. The status of Indian
tribes today, which involves collective land ownership, selfgovernment, some aspects of territorial sovereignty, ~d government-to-government relations with the United States, is unlike anything else in domestic American public law.
Indeed, a fundamental reason for the inscrutability of federal
Indian law is that analogies to other areas of public law tum out to
be false. Mainstream public law attempts to protect politically powerless members of minority groups from being treated differently
from similarly situated persons who are in the majority. 4 These individualistic and integrationist qualities spring from American domestic norms of equal protection associated with Brown v. Board of
Education. 5 In contrast, federal Indian law seeks to protect Indians
as groups - as peoples, not as people6 - from forced assimilation
and destruction of their separate status. These collectivist and separatist qualities spring, remarkably, from international law notions of
sovereignty, which were incorporated into American domestic law
in the early nineteenth century by the Marshall Court.7 Surely this
head-spinning contrast between the familiar equal-protection narrative and the unfamiliar Indian law one is a major reason why federal Indian law is sealed off from the public law mainstream.s
This exclusive focus on law is, however, highly deceiving. For I
think it is the context of federal Indian law, even more than its
murky doctrines and qualities, that leads to its marginalization. It is
plain to anyone who will look that federal Indian law is the law
governing the colonization and displacement of the indigenous peoples of this continent by Europeans. .The justifications for those colonial acts - acknowledged by our Supreme Court to tum on
Christianizing the heathen and confiscating natural resources to use
them more efficiently9 - now seem hollow. The cross-continental
march of European-Americans, the brutality of the Indian wars and
4. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); JOHN
(1980).
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. This phrase is borrowed from the evocative title of David C. Williams, The Borders of
the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759 (1991).
7. See Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996).
8. Of course, both fields have been forced to deal with racism, and the "sameness" required by the one and the "difference" protected by the other have sometimes met with
massive resistance. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 11 (1958); Lac du Flambeau Band
of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop Treaty Abuse-Wisconsin, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1284,
1286 (W.D. Wis. 1994).
9. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542-43 (1832); 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 579
(McLean, J., concurring); Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572-73, 590 (1823).
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST

May 1996]

Federal Indian Law

1975

their aftermaths, and the removal westward and ultimate isolation
of Indians on reservations is a story painful to contemplate in a
society supposedly premised upon a Constitution that protects
against governmental abuse and embodies a social contract based
on consent. The unattractiveness of this narrative, its tension with
our dominant American narrative of faith in the rule of law, and the
difficulty in knowing how to fuse these narratives into lessons of
contemporary significance all contribute to the marginal status of
federal Indian law.10
Turning to the current context, contemporary federal Indian
law, "on the ground," happens far away from the District of Columbia, on isolated lands called Indian reservations. The people it primarily affects have a third layer of citizenship - membership in the
tribe as well as citizenship in the United States and in the state in
which they reside - and may consider tribal membership the most
significant of the three. They may also adhere to some traditional
beliefs and ways of life inconsistent with western, capitalist values.
Indeed, it is no small irony that Native Americans are essentially
foreigners in their own country,11 both culturally and legally.12
Traditional public law scholarship has its difficulties in coming
to grips with such far-flung and foreign factors. Frank
Pommersheim has sought to identify these deficiencies and to begin
to remedy them in his new book, Braid of Feathers: American Indian Law and Contemporary Tribal Life. Pommersheim brings a
wealth of experience to the task. He spent over ten years living and
working on the Rosebud Sioux Reservation in South Dakota. Now
a law professor at the University of South Dakota, Pommersheim
sits as an appellate judge for both the Rosebud Sioux Tribe and the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe.
Pommersheim approaches the subject as much with his heart as
his head. He acknowledges that his experiences in Indian country
have been highly rewarding, both personally and professionally
(p. 6). Indeed, he speaks frankly of his friendship toward and obligations to "people and communities who have done so much, with
10. Consider a historian's perspective on why Indian-white history "occupies a backwater
status" in that profession:
The majority of American historians seem to regard the whole issue as an endless tale of
woe and atrocity committed mostly against Indians, a litany many find redundant, tiresome, and depressing. More pointedly, the Indian experience is viewed, and so treated,
as a curious, even quaint sideshow within the larger panorama of Anglo-American performance and achievement in North America.
Calvin Martin, An Introduction Aboard the Fidele, in THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND nm
PROBLEM OF HISTORY 3, 9 (Calvin Martin ed., 1987).
11. The point is made well by the title of Robert N. Clinton's excellent article defending
tribal sovereignty, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian
Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REv. 979 (1981).
12. Oddly, the field of public law most similar to federal Indian law is immigration law.
See Frickey, supra note 7.
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lasting good humor, to highlight the issues and enhance the choices
in my own life and those of my family" (p. 13). He recognizes that
his view "is not detached nor neutral but engaged and committed"
(p. 5), a product of his experiences "in the particular western landscape of Indian country in South Dakota" (p. 6).
This abandonment of any pretense of objective, neutral analysis,
however, does not undermine his contribution. Indeed, it seems to
me that it greatly enhances it, for it replaces the typical, and misleading, "view from nowhere" 13 with the actual context of relevance. For as Pommersheim notes, most federal Indian law
scholarship focuses almost exclusively on "the pervasive role of
Congress and the Supreme Court" (p. 1), failing to acknowledge
"the counterweight of tribal sovereignty and authority" (p. 1) and
"the understanding and implementation of the indigenous vision
that develops in its localized institutional settings" (p. 2).
This, then, is a self-proclaimed "inside-out view from the grassroots, reservation level rather than the traditional top-down view
that permeates most Indian law writing" (p. 2). What
Pommersheim seeks for tribes is legitimacy in law running in both
directions. Tribal governmental institutions, particularly tribal
courts, must have "tribal authenticity," and this " 'inside-out' authenticity, in turn, must meet the potential constraints of [federal]
judicial and congressional review that is necessary to achieve a complementary 'top-down' authenticity" (p. 134). "In many ways,"
Pommersheim says, "tribal courts are ideally situated to serve as a
bridge between local tribal culture and the dominant legal system"
(p. 194). Bi-directional connectedness and legitimacy, in turn,
could lead to a "true tribal-federal (judicial) dialogue on tribal sovereignty" that seeks "justice [as] a product of conversation rather
than unilateral declaration." 14 Ultimately, this institutional dialogue is the vehicle by which Pommersheim hopes to achieve what
he sees as "the two most important - indeed, complementary projects in the field of federal Indian law ... the decolonization of
13. See THOMAS

NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE

(1986).

14. P. 193. It is for these reasons that Pommersheim focuses on tribal courts rather than
other tribal institutions, such as tribal councils. The linkage between tribal sovereignty and
tribal courts, on the one hand, and federal courts and the broader national govemment, on
the other, is by no means obvious, however. As I understand it, and as I shall explain in the
remainder of this review, Pommersheim's argument is that tribal courts are the tribal institutions best situated to perform a translational role, articulating the nature of tribal sovereignty
and other interests so that non-Indian authorities can understand them; a justificatory role,
articulating tribal sovereignty and interests in ways that provide persuasive reasons why nonIndian authorities should not interfere with them; and a legitimating role, upholding important, shared national values through appropriate judicial processes so that federal courts will
not second-guess tribal court adjudicative results and will trust tribal courts to review the
actions of tribal councils and executive officials. Each of these tasks is part of the tribalfederal judicial dialogue in the pursuit of justice that Pommersheim seeks to foster.
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federal Indian law and the simultaneous construction of an indigenous version of tribal sovereignty and self-rule."15
Heady stuff, this. Openly utopian and yet concretely contextual,
Pommersheim asks us to imagine a decolonized federal Indian law
and a :flourishing tribal life, all with the support of the dominant
society. True to his "inside-out" approach, he first considers the
reservation context, _places the reservation within its broader context in the western United States, and then uses these contextual
understandings as the bases for crafting the legal context to achieve
the two goals he identifies. I will consider each in turn.
I. A

CONTEXT FOR CARING

Pommersheim is explicit in his rationale for examining the context of federal Indian law:
I seek to develop a sense of context - cultural, spiritual, and physical
- to help explain why Indian people are committed to reservation
life and why non-Indians need to honor and respect that commitment.
For it is this commitment to the reservation as place that undergirds
all the central legal struggles in Indian country about land, water, natural resources, and jurisdiction. Unless we understand this context,
there is little chance that we can forge a commitment to eradicate the
stigma of invidious difference while at the same time preserving an
enduring pride of difference. Without the human and cultural specifics, the field of Indian law is hopelessly abstract and disconnected
from the reality and aspiration of contemporary tribal life. The thick
description of the reservation as place provides a context for caring as
well as a firm grounding for understanding the pain and promise of
law in contemporary Indian life. [p. 8]

In my judgment, the major contribution of this book lies in the
identification and substantial satisfaction of these aspirations.
By its very nature, federal Indian law is the law of colonial
power - case law from what John Marshall once revealingly called
"the Courts of the conqueror," 16 statutes from the centralized legislature of the colonial government, and so on. It is law made by
others and imposed upon indigenous peoples. It is both unsurprising and disturbing, then, that, as Vine Deloria once wrote, "what is
missing in federal Indian law are the Indians."17
15. P. 193. One problem inherent in this project is that federal law will necessarily structure this institutional relationship, and federal lawmakers will have the usual presumptions
that federal law is nationwide and uniform. Indian tribes and their members have great diversity across this country, and yet it seems inevitable that tribal institutions and tribal law
will have to bend in somewhat similar ways to fit such a national, federal framework.
Whether these centripetal and centrifugal forces can be adequately harnessed by working
institutions is, thus, a major question.
16. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588 {1823) ..
17. Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the Content
and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 Aruz. L. REV. 203, 205 {1989).
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Law created by judges and legislators this far removed from its
context is not likely to be functional, attractive, or legitimate in the
eyes of those it most directly affects. Similarly, the legal scholars'
penchant for analysis generated within the four walls of their offices, grudgingly supplemented by occasional forays into the law library, cannot possibly produce a fully useful examination of law in
this context. To be sure, high-level theory, as well as the careful
parsing of precedent and other basic legal-process skills, have their
role in federal Indian law, as in all other law. The problem remains,
however, that under legal-process assumptions "[l]aw is a doing of
something, a purposive activity, a continuous striving to solve the
basic problems of social living. " 18 It is self-evident that law cannot
perform this function without an appreciation of the social setting
in question and the values and aspirations of the people the legal
regime most directly affects. More specifically, Native Americans,
who are full-fl.edged citizens of the United States, and Indian tribes,
which are bona fide sovereigns under domestic American law, deserve equal concern and respect in the process by which our national government, through law, carries out its responsibility of
" 'establishing, maintaining and perfecting the conditions necessary
for community life to perform its role in the complete development
of [people].' " 19
The centerpiece of Pommersheim's contextual presentation is
Chapter One, which is a slightly modified version of a law review
article he published some years ago.20 The title, The Reservation as
Place, bespeaks the sort of dignity he seeks to bestow upon locales
often viewed "as islands of poverty and despair tom from the continent of national progress" (p. 11). Pommersheim attempts to convey the
[h]idden ... notion of the reservation as place: a physical, human,
legal, and spiritual reality that embodies the history, dreams, and aspirations of Indian people, their communities, and their tribes. It is a
place that marks the endurance of Indian communities against the onslaught of a marauding European society; it is also a place that holds
the promise of fulfillment. [p. 11]

He writes "from two overarching assumptions. One is that, despite
grinding poverty and widespread despair, there is nevertheless a
flame of hope and a broadening range of choices in almost all aspects of reservation life" (p. 13). The other "is that, whatever the
18. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 148 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994).
19. Id. at 102 (quoting Joseph M. Snee, Leviathan at the Bar of Justice, in GOVERNMENT
UNDER LAW 91, 96 (Arthur Sutherland ed., 1968)).
20. See Frank Pommersheim, The Reservation as Place: A South Dakota Essay, 34 S.D. L.
REv. 246 {1989).
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conditions, tribal members have been committed to remaining indelibly Indian, proudly defining themselves as a people apart and
resisting full incorporation into the dominant society around them"
(p. 13).
In my judgment, this essay largely succeeds in making the
reader not only understand, but also empathize with, Indians' reasons for having a fundamental and spiritual attachment to the reservation. At the same time, it does not romanticize the reservation as
some idyllic setting21 or engage in a self-satisfied jeremiad excoriating non-Indians.22 Achieving the former without pandering along
the lines of the latter is no mean feat.
Pommersheim begins with a short explanation of the centrality
of land to Indian people: "Land is basic to Indian people; they are
part of it and it is part of them; it is their Mother" (p. 13). The land
is simultaneously the source of cultural connectedness, "of spiritual
origins and sustaining myth," (p.14) and "a homeland where generations and generations of relatives have lived out their lives and
destiny" (p. 14). He then turns to the legal genesis of reservations
as the result of a bargained-for exchange. Usually through a treaty
with the federal government, the tribe ceded away some aboriginal
lands and agreed to cease hostilities with non-Indians in exchange
for a guaranteed homeland of vital cultural significance over which
the tribe would exercise significant sovereignty. He then addresses
attacks upon this "measured separatism,"23 focusing on the allotment of reservation lands to individual tribal members and the
opening of remaining reservation lands to non-Indian homesteaders
(pp. 19-21). He also considers the assimilative efforts of Christian
missionaries, Bureau of Indian Affairs agents, and teachers in Indian country to destroy tribal culture, religion, and language. Particularizing this inquiry, he reviews the South Dakota experience,
21. See p. 34 (noting the "rupture in the relationship of the people to the land" and complaining about "disturbing utopian visions that endlessly romanticize the people and the
land"). The current legal analogue to this problem of romanticism might be found in cases
suggesting that tribes have more sovereignty in situations in which they are engaged in traditional ways. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 441-44 (1989) (holding that tribe may zone land owned by non-Indians
only in portion of the reservation traditionally closed to the public, where few non-Indian
lands are located and the area approximates a pristine region retaining uniquely Indian character); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 733 (1983) (implying that tribal sovereignty is greatest
where there has been "a tradition of tribal self-government" on the subject of dispute);
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156-57 (1980)
(stating that tribal interest in raising revenue by marketing goods to non-Indians is "strongest
when the revenues are derived from value generated on the reservation").
22. See p. 5 (stating that the point is "not to excoriate the 'white man' " but rather "to
look to a more humane and morally coherent era that is based in the core values of respect
and dignity"); p. 21 ("The point is not to assign blame - an essentially fruitless exercise but rather to comprehend more deeply the forces at work on the reservation.").
23. P. 16 (using a term from CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND
nIE LAW 4 (1986)).
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where all reservations suffered through allotment and other Indian
lands were lost to Missouri River water projects.
Pommersheim concludes with a consideration of the reservation
within the broader context of the American West. He argues that
"[d]espite the pervasive conflict between tribes and the state and
federal governments, and between Indians and non-Indians, other
more unitive factors point to similarities in situation that are often
not perceived and occasionally even ignored" (p. 27). Indians and
non-Indians alike in the West share space, aridity, a love of their
land, and a complicated relationship with the federal government.
Tribes are often criticized as being too dependent on federal largesse. Pommersheim correctly points out, however, that their nonIndian neighbors are similarly dependent on the federal government and survive through farm subsidies and below-market access
to grazing, water, and other public goods.24 He suggests that the
future for both sides is inextricably linked, and if each would "recognize the permanence and legitimacy of the other" (p. 30) and engage in dialogue, much common ground could be identified and
usefully exploited. In particular, both sides might be able to develop an overlapping sense of place.25
For me, this chapter is the cornerstone of the book. It speaks to
me in a multitude of ways, providing factual information, cultural
perspective, and normative insight. It goes a long way toward filling the yawning chasm between federal Indian law in the books and
federal Indian law on the ground. Moreover, I take some solace
from it. The chapter ends on a note of hope,26 a commodity all too
scarce in federal Indian law.
24. Yet the Westerners' fierce sense of independence and their resentment of the federal
government make all this a strange mix, aptly summed up in the injunction to "'[g]et out, and
give us more money.'" P. 28 (quoting WALLACE STEGNER, THE AMERICAN WESr AS L1V1No
SPACE 15 (1987)).
25. Thus, Pommetsheim's defense of tribal sovereignty builds on legal themes - preexisting rights (to sovereignty and land), unconsented deprivations of these rights (unilateral
colonization and displacement of indigenous peoples, forced assimilation), and bilateral legal
acknowledgment of those rights (in treaties) -and on cultural themes - the importance of
the land and self-determination to Indian culture. For these reasons, in this context there is
an intimate connection between sovereignty and individual and group rights. In this instance,
at least, sovereignty is more than simply the rights or authority of a government.
26. Consider its final paragraph:
The breath of despair once so prevalent in Indian country seems to be yielding to the
air of hope. The answers to these troubling questions about the land and its economic,
cultural, and spiritual roles do not readily reveal themselves, but the questions are increasingly recognized and energetically posed. Nor are these questions confined to Indians and reservations. They also pierce with unerring aim the larger society's
assumptions about cultural diversity and the use and exploitation of the earth to sustain
economic prodigality and waste. The questions inevitably challenge all of us - Indian
and non-Indian, tribes and states alike - to summon the honor and wisdom of ourselves, our communities, and our traditions and to apply them to these relentless and
provocative issues.
P. 36.
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With all that said, the chapter may not work for everyone. I
have assigned the underlying law review article to my students in
federal Indian law for several years running. Many students find
the article worthwhile, but some have difficulty internalizing the
material. For them, it may seem too sentimental, too much a matter of airy hopefulness about an environment and the people who
populate it.27 The hopefulness of the essay may also strike some
persons as a dated indicium of a short period in South. Dakota's
recent history when non-Indians seemed especially receptive to
conversations with Indians.28 Nonetheless, the impetus to care
about the context of federal Indian law, along with significant perspectives on that context, strike me as an invaluable contribution to
the field.
II.

CONTEXTUAL LEGITIMACY FOR TRIBAL LAW
AND TRIBAL COURTS

As I understand it, one of Pommersheim's most basic goals is to
persuade the broader non-Indian legal community to care enough
In a later chapter, Pommersheim proposes that tribes and states should attempt to abjure
litigation and engage in dialogue to reach accords on fundamental issues. See pp. 153-61.
27. To be sure, these reactions may be a product of when the students read the essay. My
students and I discuss it at the beginning of the course, as a way to introduce the reservation
context and the importance of federal law to it. At that point, the students may be unable to
synthesize legal doctrine and context sufficiently to profit optimallly from the reading. Nonetheless, it seems important to begin the course with an exposure to this context that is so
foreign to many students, and I know of no other writing that works as well as this essay.
Rereading the essay at the end of the course may be necessary for a fuller appreciation of
it. Indeed, when I asked a policy question in my most recent federal Indian law examination,
several students not only mentioned this article, but also commented on how the analysis in it
had informed their perspectives.
A more fundamental problem may be that students expect doctrinal analysis when, in
fact, Pommersheim is attempting to provide the context for his basically nondoctrinal, postmodern approach to federal Indian law. See infra text accompanying notes 47-61. Essentially, the "reservation as place" is a relational and constitutive concept - focusing on the
deep relationships of Indians to the land and to each other and how that is constitutive of
individual, collective, and geographical identity - more than a traditional legal concept,
based on the law of property, that divorces "things" from the people who "own" them. I am
grateful to Jeff Rutherford, my former student, for this insight. In future classes, I shall attempt to determine whether a more forthright confrontation between post-modern analysis
and traditional legal conceptions would be fruitful.
28. The Reservation as Place was published in the South Dakota Law Review in 1989.
See supra note 20. Chapter 5 of the book, entitled Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future?, originally appeared at 36 S.D. L. REV. 239 (1991). In that period, the state was headlong in its centennial celebration of 1989, which provoked extended discussion of the history
and present-day situation of Indians in the state. Governor Mickelson declared 1990 the
Year of Reconciliation, a time for attempts at meaningful state-tribal dialogue. See pp. 154,
251 n.89. Contrast a recent comment of the current governor, Bill Janklow, alleging that
South Dakota Indian tribes have a "master plan .•. to acquire all of western South Dakota"
with proceeds from Indian gaming, which was immediately attacked as exacerbating racial
tensions. Janklow Says Tribes Have "Master Plan" To Buy Western South Dakota, Associated
Press Political Service, Aug. 25, 1995, available in Westlaw, ASSOCPPS .File, 1995 WL
6739295.
.
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about the Indian context to provide tribes a breathing space for the
construction of institutions, particularly tribal courts, that can develop a truly indigenous law. His message is a timely one, for tribal
court jurisdiction may well now be expansive enough to create this
opportunity.
Understanding this jurisdictional context requires a brief overview of the nature and limits of tribal sovereignty. One of the most
basic premises of federal Indian law is that, prior to contact with
Europeans, tribes had sovereignty over their members and their areas.29 The European encounter locked each tribe into an exclusive
sovereign-sovereign relationship with the "discovering" European
country, such that the tribe could have sovereign relations and engage in land transactions only with that country.3o This category of
limitations on tribal sovereignty based on tribes' status as "domestic
dependent nations"31 was more recently expanded to deny any
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians32 and to restrict civil regulatory control over non-Indians on lands within reservations that they
own in fee simple.33 In addition, of course, tribes have lost authority consensually - through treaty agreements, for example - and
nonconsensually, when Congress, through the exercise of its judicially sanctioned "plenary power" over Indian affairs,34 has explicitly preempted tribal power.3s What all this means is that tribes
retain sovereignty today so long as the particular exercise of power
is not inconsistent with domestic dependent status and has never
been ceded or taken away.
That reservoir of sovereignty turns out to be significant.36 For
tribal courts, it includes the authority to exercise criminal jurisdic29. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572-73 (1823).
30. See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573-74.
31. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831}.
32. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). The Court later
held that tribes also lack the capacity to exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians - that is, Indians who are members of a tribe different from the one attempting to
exercise the criminal jurisdiction in question. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990).
Congress has overturned this result by a statute that purports to recognize the tribe's inherent sovereignty in this situation, rather than to delegate federal authority to the tribes. See 25
u.s.c. § 1301(2) (1994).
33. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
34. For a helpful overview, see Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its
Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195 (1984).
35. Under the canons of interpretation found in federal Indian law precedents, Congress
must act clearly before courts will sanction an invasion of Indian interests. See Frickey, supra
note 1, at 398-426. A recent example of preemption of tribal power is South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 (1993) (holding that a federal statute taking Indian lands for public
recreation area that remained within reservation divested tribe of authority to regulate nonmembers in that area).
36. In addition to presumptive full legislative sovereignty over its members, tribes have
been recognized as retaining certain legislative authority over nonmembers, including, for
example, the power to tax nonmembers engaged in consensual economic activity in Indian
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tion over members37 and over nonmember Indians,38 and to exclude most nonmembers from the reservation.39 Tribal judicial
jurisdiction in civil cases is quite extensive. · State courts have no
inherent jurisdiction to entertain causes of action against Indians
that arise on the reservation.40 Because such suits will rarely involve diversity of citizenship, a federal question, or the like, a federal judicial forum ordinarily will not be available, and thus they
must almost always be brought in tribal court. Moreover, while tribal courts may not exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,41
entertaining a reservation-based civil cause of action against a nonIndian is not foreclosed. The Supreme Court has held that federal
courts have federal-question jurisdiction to hear the non-Indian's
objection that this tribal-court jurisdiction is inconsistent with domestic dependent status.42 Nonetheless, the non-Indian must first
exhaust all tribal court remedies, including appellate ones,43 and, if
the matter does return to the federal district court, the only issue is
whether the tribal court had jurisdiction.44
Finally, it remains the case that the Constitution does not constrain the exercise of inherent tribal sovereignty in general or the
activities of tribal courts in particular.45 Congress applied many
constitutional limitations to the tribes, however, by adopting the
country. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195, 198-200 (1985); Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137-38 (1982).
37. See United States v. Wheeler. 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978).
38. See supra note 32.
39. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696 (1990) (dictum).
40. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218-19 (1959). Of course, Congress may change
this rule through the exercise of its plenary power, as it did in adopting Act of Apr. 11, 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. IV, §§ 401-02, 82 Stat. 73, 78-79 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1321-1322 (1994)), a statute that authorizes courts in certain states to assume jurisdiction
over civil and criminal cases arising in Indian country.
41. See supra text accompanying note 32.
42. See National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 853 (1985).
43. See Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16-17 (1987).
44. See Iowa Mutua~ 480 U.S. at 19. See generally Timothy W. Juranko, Exhaustion of
Tribal Remedies in the Lower Courts After National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual: Toward a Consistent Treatment of Tribal Courts by the Federal Judicial System, 78 MINN. L. REv.
259 (1993); Laurie Reynolds, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies: Extolling Tribal Sovereignty
While Expanding Federal Jurisdiction, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1089 (1995); Alex Tallchief Skibine,

Deference Owed Tribal Courts' Jurisdictional Determinations: Towards Co-Existence, Understanding, and Respect Between Different Cultural and Judicial Norms, 24 N.M. L. REv. 191
(1994).
45. This understanding is as old as Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding that
because tribal sovereignty existed prior to the Constitution and is not derived from it, tribal
action is not subject to the Constitution). Of course, if the tribe is exercising delegated
federal authority rather than inherent tribal sovereignty, a strong argument can be made that
the Constitution attaches. Cf. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 553-56 {1975) (upholding federal statute authorizing tribe to regulate liquor in Indian country, including when sold
by non-Indians, and conceptualizing the statute as delegating authority to the tribe rather
than recognizing the tribe's inherent powers).
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Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).46 Consistent with
Pommersheim's comparative institutional sensitivity, however, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the ICRA narrowly, holding that
the statute embodies no implied private right of action for civil relief in federal court.47 Thus, ICRA claims are the domain of the
tribal courts, which therefore have the opportunity to place an indigenous interpretation on Anglo-American concepts such as due
process and equal protection.
After providing an overview of this terrain (pp. 79-98),
Pommersheim focuses his attention on a fundamental dilemma.
Within this shared federal-tribal judicial domain, tribal courts can
function well only if they have legitimacy both in the tribe and in
the federal system. Without this dual legitimacy, the tribal courts
are doomed to ineffectiveness, for they will be either outsider federal agencies without any tribal support or indigenous actors lacking the federal backing necessary to withstand attack within the
broader legal system. Yet there is great tension in this enterprise,
for the indigenous qualities that may foster legitimacy within the
tribe may undercut the legal-process values necessary for legitimacy
within the broader legal community as well as within some segments of the tribal community itself.
Pommersheim sees the issue essentially as an overlapping problem of the construction of legal institutions and law. Tribal courts
must have the legitimacy necessary both within the tribe and the
federal system to elaborate a body of law that itself will be legitimate from the dual perspectives of the tribe and the federal courts.
Thus, in Chapter Three, he considers ways to foster the institutional
legitimacy of tribal courts, and, in Chapter Four, he turns to how
the jurisprudence of tribal courts might unfold. He speaks, of
course, from the practical experience of a sitting tribal appellate
judge.48
His general prescriptions are, it seems to me, quite appropriate.
He is right to suggest that, once tribal courts attain the formal legitimacy necessary under the rule of law - for example, they are duly
established by a federally recognized tribe - they should ·concentrate on developing a contextual legitimacy running simultaneously
in two directions (the tribal and the federal) more than on other,
more formal institutional matters. To illustrate the problem, consider a fundamental issue of the formal and the functional: the absence of a separation of powers in many tribal constitutions, and the
46. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, §§ 201-203, 82 Stat. 77 (1968) (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1303 (1994)).

47. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59-72 (1978) (finding only remedy
enforceable in federal court is habeas corpus).
48. See supra text accompanying note 12.
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real possibility that the tribal government may refuse to obey a tribal court decision or might even attack the institution of tribal
courts itself by seeking to remove the judge or abolish the judiciary.
As a formal matter, one might attempt to remedy this situation by
seeking an amendment to the tribal constitution. Presented this abstractly, however, why should tribal members support this reform?
For what practical and experiential reasons might they wish to invest such faith in often untested tribal courts?49 In place of formal
reform based on abstract political theory and leaps of faith,
Pommersheim seems to suggest that the tribal courts must make
their legitimacy the old-fashioned way-. they must earn it, through
the hard, even courageous work of developing an authentic indigenous jurisprudence that nonetheless accords with the fundamental
Anglo-American legal-process values expected by both the federal
courts and many tribal members.
More particularly, to foster the contextual legitimacy of tribal
courts, Pommersheim proposes that these courts focus on bringing
together the practitioners involved with them - attorneys as well
as tribal advocates without any formal legal training - "to form a
community helping to carry out an important legitimating function"
(p. 71). A tribal bar examination, tribal ethics code, and programs
of continuing legal education would foster the development of a
professional community that both actually serves the tribal and federal communities well and creates the patina of professionalism that
will lend confidence to the whole operation. More generally, the
tribal bar could become a unique interpretive community that could
guide the difficult process of molding tribal-court adjudication to
serve the twin functions of tribal and federal legitimacy.
Pommersheim is surely right to seek such a cooperative effort in
the construction of contextual legitimacy for tribal courts. After all,
as Steven Burton has explained in a work on which Pommersheim
relies,50 it is the work of the legal interpretive community within its
49. Lest this seem a question with an obvious answer, consider whether Americans today
would support the institution of Marbury v. Madison-style judicial review if a new Constitution were being drafted and submitted to a plebiscite. The much-debated "countermajoritarian difficulty" that envelops much public-law scholarship is usually discussed at the
level of abstract political and moral philosophy. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962).
The people, in place of the scholars, would see the issue much more practically, I would
think, and their views will depend upon their own encounters with the judiciary and their
practical fears or hopes concerning a political and administrative process unconstrained by
constitutional judicial review. The people's own narrative relationship with the story of
Brown - or the story of Roe, or the story of police practices in their communities, and so on
- would surely have more persuasive force than a scholar's theoretical contributions.
Similarly, when the federal government investigates the operations of tribal courts, it examines the day-to-day successes and failures, not mere abstract principles such as tribal sovereignty or the separation of powers. See p. 132.
SO. Seep. 223 n.49 (citing STEVEN BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL
REASONING (1985}).
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complex, controversial, but substantially overlapping web of beliefs
that specifies the processes and substance of law, as well as its legitimacy, far more than formal deduction from first principles. Moreover, this linkage of education concerning the unique aspects of
indigenous law and tribal courts with the role of a professional community is reminiscent of Richard Posner's suggestion concerning
the most basic goals of legal education.51
Pommersheim maintains this antiformalist theme when more directly considering the substance of tribal law. Here he firmly ties
himself to the mast of much postmodern legal scholarship. Based
on the work of Martha Minow,52 he posits a dilemma of difference
in this context - when should we view tribal institutions and law as
different from their dominant-society counterparts in order to reflect authentic values, and when would we see such visions of differences as stigmatizing and hindering the goals of legitimating them
within both the tribe and the dominant society? He posits three
tribal-court tools for carving out legitimate differences: language,
narrative, and the pursuit of justice (p. 103).
In essence, he posits a hermeneutical tribal approach to deploying and interpreting legal language in a manner that holds some
promise of legitimate legal evolution and reform.s 3 Narratives by
tribal courts can educate the dominant society about competing cultural and moral visions, as well as demonstrate concrete reasons
why these courts might give little force to some aspects of law imposed upon them from above. Pommersheim illustrates this point
of tribal counternarrative by mentioning a tribal appellate opinion
he wrote that skeptically viewed a provision of the tribal constitution limiting civil judicial jurisdiction over non-Indians because it
51. As Posner notes:
The most important thing that law school imparts to its students is a feel for the outer
bounds of permissible legal argumentation at the time when the education is being imparted. (Later those bounds will change, of course.) What "thinking like a lawyer"
means is not the use of special analytic powers but an awareness of approximately how
plastic law is at the frontiers - neither infinitely plastic, ••• nor rigid and predetermined, as many laypersons think - and of the permissible "moves" in arguing for, or
against, a change in the law. It is neither method nor doctrine, but a repertoire of acceptable arguments and a feel for the degree and character of doctrinal stability, or,
more generally, for the contours of a professional culture - a professional culture lovable to some, hateful to others.
RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 100 (1990).
52. Seep. 235 n.1 (citing MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1990)).
53.
Reading has two faces. One is the text or source of law anchored in some time past. The
second is the current situation of the reader presently seeking to understand the text and
to apply it to the situation at hand. The resulting "reading,'' whatever it is, meshes two
times, two places, and two interpretations. This process is essentially dialectic in nature
and entertains (at least theoretically} the possibility of the emergence of a new synthesis
that is less lethal or even nonlethal. As the legal reader must respect the text, however
oppressive it might be, so too the text must respect the reader's aspiration and otherness.

P.104.

May 1996]

Federal Indian Law

1987

was the result not of indigenous concerns but rather of unilateral
intrusion by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (pp. 108-09). Embracing
the work of James Boyd White (pp. 112-15), Pommersheim views
the pursuit of justice as an act of "translation," the liberating of
legal texts from any obsolete associations surrounding their origin
and the transformation of meaning in light of current context.
These hermeneutical, narrative, and translational moves, Pommersheim suggests, should incorporate the emerging international
human rights norms concerning indigenous persons (pp. 123-26)
and suggest concrete modifications of federal public law, including
the abandonment of the plenary power doctrine,54 greater respect
and autonomy for tribal sovereignty, and a more coherent set of
doctrines (pp. 120-22).
Although much of his analysis has the signature of recent humanistic legal scholarship, he ends this discussion with a nod to institutional imperatives in law that would make any traditional legalprocess scholar proud. For Pommersheim, "all significant public
values are realized through institutions. Better institutions are essential to better lives" (p. 131). The failure of federal Indian law to
pay sufficient attention to this issue has "create[d] a grossly distorted picture of the relationship of law to sovereignty" (p. 131) in
the field that unduly values the mere federal endorsement of the
concepts of tribal sovereignty and tribal courts without concerning
itself with the actual development of flourishing institutions with
appropriate procedures.55
It is in this discussion, I think, that Pommersheim himself runs
into an essentially insoluble dilemma - not one of difference, but
of diffusiveness. He talks about the importance of concrete context, but much of the presentation is made secondhand, through
postmodern, abstract scholarly moves. This is an inevitable problem in antiformalist legal scholarship, but it is an acute one in this
context, where tribal courts and law are especially foreign to
readers.
I know of no way to solve this difficulty. Enlightening the abstract discussions of dilemmas of difference, narratives, justice as
translation, and so on, through the use of examples is, however,
surely an ameliorative technique. Pommersheim does attempt to
do just that. For example, he refers to those involved in the tribal
judicial system as working together in many small ways in the
shared enterprise of moving tribal courts toward legitimacy (pp. 59,
127-28). He highlights a field trip his class took to the Rosebud
54. See supra text accompanying note 34.
55. Cf. HART & SACKS, supra note 18, at 3-6 (conducting a legal-process analysis of the
development and operation of a system of institutionalized procedures for settling societal
questions).

1988

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 94:1973

Sioux Tribal Court, where the chief judge told the students about
his efforts to promote the legitimacy of the court by traveling

throughout the small communities on the reservation and talking
with tribal members about the work of the court. The class also
observed the judge handle an intrafamily dispute, in which he followed tribal custom in essentially allowing the parties to speak
without interruption and in their native language.56 Pommersheim
refers to various provisions of tribal law to illustrate jurisdictional
issues (pp. 79, 85-87) and law reform (pp. 127-28). He uses several
tribal court opinions to exemplify the application of tribal law
against the backdrop of federal authority.57 He reminds practitioners that tribal courts are the authoritative expositors of tribal law,
and thus that state cases are not dispositive and decisions of other
tribal courts might be persuasive (pp. 128-29).
Pommersheim does not supplement these firsthand South Dakota experiences with those found in tribal courts elsewhere. That
choice is defensible, for a wider sweep might have diluted his focus.
Nonetheless, the interested reader would profit from an examination of the literature on other tribal courts.58 In particular, if the
separation of powers and tribal court independence are major concerns, as Pommersheim (pp. 68, 73-74) and others59 have explained,
an examination of these subjects both from Pommersheim's South

56. See pp. 69-70; see also pp. 131-32 (noting that the chief judge holds week-long court
open house, hosts presentations about the court, and has organized an advisory group concerning tribal court practice that is the precursor to a bar association).
57. See pp. 88-89 (observing that one tribal court adopted "minimum contacts" test of
International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), for due process limits on tribal court
jurisdiction under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994)); supra text
accompanying note 54.
58. See, e.g., Dennis W. Arrow, Oklahoma's Tribal Courts: A Prologue, The First Fifteen
Years of the Modern Era, and a Glimpse at the Road Ahead, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 5
(1994); Michael Taylor, Modern Practice in Indian Courts, 10 U. PUGET SoUNo L. REV. 231
(1987); Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 Aruz. L. REV. 225
(1989); Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV.
225 (1994); Jayne Wallingford, The Role of Tradition in the Navajo Judiciary: Reemergence
and Revival, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 141 (1994); Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes From It":
Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REv. 175 (1994); Frederic Brandfon, Comment, Traditional and Judicial Review in the American Tribal Court System, 38 UCLA L. REV. 991
(1991); Daniel L. Lowery, Note, Developing a Tribal Common Law Jurisprudence: The Navajo Experience, 1969-1992, 18 AM. IND. L. REv. 379 (1993). On the relationship of tribal
courts to the larger judicial system, see Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal
Union, 26 W1LLAMETIE L. REv. 841 (1990); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian
Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 671 (1989).

59. See, e.g., Brandfon, supra note 58, at 1006-09; Valencia-Weber, supra note 58, at 238
n.40.
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Dakota perspective6o and from elsewhere61 would seem especially
useful. Pommersheim acknowledges the importance of the issue
and opines that "[m]any tribes are sensitive to this problem and
have moved to a policy of de facto, if not de jure, separation of
powers" (p. 74). His support for this generalization, however, rests
only on his own personal experiences in South Dakota and on conversations with Indian judges there (p. 225 n.71), which may leave
some readers unsatisfied concerning the validity of the conclusion
locally, not to mention nationally. He does note that the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe, for which he sits as an appellate judge, recently
amended its constitution to incorporate a formal separation of powers (p. 74).
Despite these efforts, and for all of his emphasis upon coritext,
Pommersheim's discussion of tribal courts and law seems more abstract and less intensely human than his discussion of the reservation as place. Of course, it may simply be that talking about law
and legal institutions cannot be carried out with· the same sense of
humanity as talking about a cultural and sovereign homeland for a
people. The typical lawyer's joke is premised on precisely this notion of the disjunction between law and the profession of lawyering
on the one hand and life and the needs of ordinary people on the
other. For Pommersheim, of course, the problem is essentially that
he has joined the other side - the perspective of life in general and
tribal members in particular - while simultaneously writing descriptively and prescriptively about the law of, and the profession of
lawyering in, tribal courts. I was not left disappointed with his discussion so much as left longing for more concrete examples and
guidance concerning this challenging and important topic.

60. See Runs After v. United States, 766 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1985) (affirming federal district court's refusal to intervene into Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe election dispute despite
allegations that the tribal council had terminated a tribal judge and rescinded the tribal
court's order requiring reapportionment of tribal council in accord with results of referendum election); LeCompte v. Jewett, 12 ILR 6025, 6027 (Chy. R. Sx. Ct. App. 1985) (adopting
Marbury approach to judicial review of actions of tribal council and undertaking judicial
supervision of tribal elections). Presumably Pommersheim would approve of this scenario:
the federal courts stayed their hand, and the tribal court mustered the authority to impose
judicial review. See also p. 74 (stating that the recently amended Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe
Constitution incorporates formal separation of powers). It would have been interesting to
read a discussion by Pommersheim of this or a similar tribal legislative-judicial confrontation.
61. See Valencia-Weber, supra note 58, at 238 n.40. Perhaps the most famous tribal appellate court opinion imposing judicial review in the face of the hostility of tribal leaders is
Halona v. MacDonald, 1 Navajo Rptr. 189 (1978), in which the Navajo Court of Appeals
invoked a power of judicial review even though the Navajo have no written constitution. See
id.
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CONTEXT, LEGITIMACY, AND THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW

Pommersheim is not alone in his suggestion for greater attention
to context in federal Indian law.62 His major contributions, in my
view, are twofold. First, his thick description of the reservation
amounts to a translation of that context into words understandable
by the larger legal community. Second, his analysis of the comparative institutional competence of tribal courts and federal institutions
in accurately assessing this context and working within it to create
legal doctrines that are both functional and normatively attractive is
a major innovation.
True to his "inside-out" mission, Pommersheim focuses on indirect routes to reform - building the tribal judicial institutions necessary for an indigenous jurisprudence - rather than on direct
doctrinal evolution of federal Indian law. To the extent that he discusses those doctrines, his most basic message is that federal Indian
law simply should make way for the development of tribal
jurisprudence.
A good illustration is his complaint about the plenary power
doctrine. Under the case law, congressional power in Indian affairs
is essentially limitless.63 This doctrine is subject to a fairly obvious
formal critique. It seems hopelessly inconsistent with one of the
most basic principles of constitutional interpretation - the McCulloch64 understanding that Congress possesses only those powers
delegated to it in Article I or elsewhere in the Constitution.6s
Pommersheim alludes to this criticism (pp. 40, 44, 46-50, 120-21)
but it seems clear that his major objection is not formal and doctrinal, but rather pragmatic and contextual. For tribes, the problem
with plenary power is its "constant destabilizing threat to their very
existence and right to self-determination" (p. 122). He urges con62. For relatively recent commentary, see Robert N. Clinton, Reservation Specificity and
Indian Adjudication: An Essay on the Importance of Limited Contextualism in Indian Law, 8
HAMLINE L. RE.v. 543 (1985); Deloria, supra note 17; Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent,
Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 18 CAL. L REV. 1137,
1207-08, 1219-22 (1990); Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Not "Strictly" Racial: A Response to
"Indians as Peoples," 39 UCLA L. REv. 169 (1991).
63. See Newton, supra note 34.
64. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
65. As explained earlier, the only mention of Indians in Article I provides Congress with
the authority to regulate commerce with the tribes. See supra note 2. Far from being an
express grant of unlimited power, under ordinary textual interpretation this clause creates
the negative inference that Congress lacks authority to regulate Indian affairs except when
commerce is concerned. Of course, other enumerated powers - the war power, the treaty
power, power over federal lands and the admission of new states, and the like - may aggregate into a broad authority for Congress to engage in sovereign relations with tribes beyond
the commercial context. Even when aggregated, however, Congress's authority in this area
cannot be interpreted easily to be "plenary," if by that term unlimited authority is intended.
See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 7; Newton, supra note 34, at 196.
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gressional66 or judicial67 amelioration of the plenary power doctrine, but acknowledges the unlikelihood of such reforms in the
immediate future.6s He places his primary hope for reform not on
the efforts of non-Indian public officials or scholars,69 but on the
tribal-federal institutional dialogue he has attempted to foster.10
In the last analysis, for Pommersheim, the keys to reform in federal Indian law are translation, education, and a resulting empathy.
Tribes are to be the primary actors, and federal and state political
and judicial officials are left in a reactive posture - they are to
defer rather than intrude, listen rather than command, empathize
rather than colonize. He recognizes that "[t]he process of
decolonization can never lead back to a precolonized society"
(p. 99). Rather than "institutionaliz[ing] the false dichotomy of
dominant versus indigenous" (p. 195), the reform must "synthesize
the best of both worlds while actively seeking to achieve a sovereignty that realizes both the necessary federal deference and the
normative space to make authentic and enduring tribal choices" (p.
195). He acknowledges that "[s]uch efforts flow not from mere academic inquiry but from work of the heart and mind" (p. 200). Indeed, he concludes the book as follows:
Inevitably, the feather of Indian law jurisprudence will continue to
be a prominent one in the braid of tribal life, complete with the potential to advance and enrich the quality of contemporary indigenous
(and majoritarian) life. This potential future is, however, by no
means assured, for we must still meet the challenges of history, national diversity, and the ideal of justice. Yet we may be guided by the
geography of hope, with its coordinates of commitment, respect, imagination, and engagement. [p. 200]

In a famous and eerily parallel passage, Emily Dickinson once
wrote that " 'hope' is the thing with feathers - That perches in the
soul - And sings the tune without the words - And never stops
66. See pp. 189-90 (arguing that Congress should recognize perniciousness of plenary
power doctrine and perhaps enact statute recognizing tribal sovereignty); see also pp. 190-91
(proposing a constitutional amendment recognizing permanence of tribes).
67. See pp. 190-93 (asking federal courts to reinvigorate tribal·sovereignty doctrine, perhaps in part by emulating the moral and ethical engagement Chief Justice Marshall demonstrated to some extent in early cases).
68. Seep. 190 (concerning congressional action); pp. 144-53, 190-91 (noting that recent
trends in Supreme Court have been adverse to tribal interests).
69. See p. 240 n.85 ("I believe most people in the field of Indian Jaw, but particularly at
the state and federal level, have little understanding or 'feel' for the real threat - used often
enough in history ... - that plenary power holds for Indian people and tribes.").
70. Pommersheim states:
Reassertion of the sovereignty doctrine can be greatly augmented, in part, if the courts
pay close attention to the articulation of tribal sovereignty as it emanates from tribal
court jurisprudence. This emerging jurisprudence contributes significantly in advancing
the tribal voice as part of the judicial dialogue on the parameters and contemporary
meaning of tribal sovereignty.
P. 190.
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- At all." 71 Narratives rooted in original sin, of course, tend to
generate this sort of a corresponding incarnation of hope as well as
an ethic of conscience and good works. Federal Indian law,
grounded as it is in a colonization based on dubious justifications,12
qualifies as such a narrative. Pommersheim, who acknowledges the
influence of theology (p. 35), including that of the liberation variety
(pp. 105-06), sees the hope for this narrative incarnate in tribal
courts, whose "words and actions . . . do have their own unique
'redemptive' potential."73
Many readers will doubt whether those institutions, which
Pommersheim admits are new and fragile, can withstand this
stress.74 No'reader, however, could possibly doubt his sincerity or
his engagement. For if others in the academy and elsewhere lack
faith in the assurance of these things hoped for, they must respect
Pommersheim's conviction of things not seen, his courage in subjecting federal InC:lian law to the mirror of life, dim though the reflection may be.1s In the end, no scholar should doubt his
significant contribution to a field he rightly criticizes as removed
from reality, impoverished of empathy, and lacking in the engagement " 'of our private integrity and our public duty ... what Pascal
called "the grandeur and the misery" of our common humanity.' "76

71. Emily Dickinson, Poem No. 254, st. 1.
72. See supra text accompanying note 9.
73. P. 106. The relationship of law and religion is, of course, an immense topic well beyond the scope of this essay. Nonetheless, I cannot resist citing a provocative recent essay by
Harold Berman on the spiritual qualities of both that seems consistent with Pommersheim's
underlying approach. See Harold J. Berman, Law and Logos, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 143
(1994). One important commentator on law and religion, Milner Ball, has also published
extensively on federal Indian law. See, e.g., MILNER S. BALL, THE WoRD AND THa LAW
(1993); Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1;
Milner S. Ball, Introduction to Symposium, Native American Law, 28 GA. L. REV. 299 (1994);
Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2280
(1989).
74. See supra note 14 (summarizing the formidable tasks Pommersheim places before
tribal courts).
75. Cf. Hebrews 11:1; 1 Corinthians 13:12. Hope that is seen is, after all, a contradiction
in terms. Cf. Romans 8:24-25.
76. P. 35 (quoting the Christian commentator Jaroslav Pelikan).

